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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] x86/entry/pti: avoid setting CR3 when it's already correct
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 07:46:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180111064631.GD14920@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ae5cc387-f56e-4d8c-365a-8238e7e7d7bd@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 12:29:17PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 01/09/2018 04:56 AM, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> > @@ -214,6 +214,11 @@
> >  .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
> >  	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
> >  	mov	%cr3, \scratch_reg
> > +
> > +	/* if we're already on the kernel PGD, we don't switch */
> > +	testq $(PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK), \scratch_reg
> > +	jz .Lend_\@
> > +
> >  	ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
> 
> Willy, this is not specific to your patch, but it is one of the first
> *changes* to this code since Spectre, thus I'm bringing it up in this
> thread.
> 
> The code already has some, but new conditional branches give me the
> willies.  None of them take the form that can be used to exploit
> Spectre/Variant1 that I can see, but I do think we need to start talking
> about why this is not vulnerable and probably documenting it in the
> entry code.
> 
> Spectre/V1 (conditional branches)
>  * Data reads in entry/exit when you have the user CR3 must be in
>    cpu_entry_area and readable to a Meltdown exploit, anyway.  That
>    implies that there is no data to be leaked in the address space
>    at all at this point.
>  * Conditional branches in the entry/exit code with a kernel CR3 value
>    are the only concern.  It is safe, however, if the data being checked
>    is not user-controllable.
> 
> Spectre/V2 (indirect branches)
>  * Indirect Branches in the entry code are forbidden because of
>    Spectre/V2.  Retpolines or other mitigations (IBRS) must be used
>    instead.
> 
> Anybody disagree?
> 
> In this case, the data being checked (CR3) is not user-controllable and
> there are no indirect branches.  So this code is OK.

Just let me know what comment you'd like me to add there. I suppose
something like "This code has code has been checked against Spectre/v1/v2
attacks ; it's safe as CR3 is not user-controllable and there's no
indirect branches" ?

Thanks,
Willy

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-11  6:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-09 12:56 [RFC PATCH v2 0/6] Per process PTI activation Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] x86/mm: add a pti_disable entry in mm_context_t Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_GET_NOPTI and ARCH_SET_NOPTI to enable/disable PTI Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 14:36     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 14:54         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 21:26           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-09 21:29             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 21:32               ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 21:46                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 22:06                   ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 22:20                     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 22:29                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-09 22:40                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 14:42                         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10 15:39                           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 16:09                             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10 16:19                               ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 17:28                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10  7:31                       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  7:37                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:59                           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-09 23:53                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10  4:25                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:25               ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10 14:45                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-10 15:43                   ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 15:45                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-09 21:34             ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 21:41             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 21:50               ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 22:03                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:13             ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-12 15:03   ` David Laight
2018-01-12 15:06     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] x86/pti: add a per-cpu variable pti_disable Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:19   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  7:29     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  8:01       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  8:50         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  8:59           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  9:00             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] x86/pti: don't mark the user PGD with _PAGE_NX Willy Tarreau
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] x86/entry/pti: avoid setting CR3 when it's already correct Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:16   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  7:18     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 20:29   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11  6:46     ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2018-01-09 12:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] x86/entry/pti: don't switch PGD on when pti_disable is set Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  7:15   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-10  7:23     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10  8:22   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-10  9:11     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:21       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10 19:39         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:44           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10 19:50         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10 20:04           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-11  6:42           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 15:29             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 15:44               ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 15:51                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 17:02                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-11 18:21                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-11 18:30                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 18:32                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 18:36                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 18:38                         ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 18:51                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 18:57                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 19:05                               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 19:07                               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-11 19:17                                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 19:19                                   ` Olivier Galibert
2018-01-11 19:26                                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 19:34                                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-11 21:23                                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 21:28                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 22:06                                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-12 16:37                                               ` David Laight
2018-01-11 19:12                               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 19:38                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-11 19:11                           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 20:00                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 17:09                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-11 17:40                   ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 17:53                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-11 18:05                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 18:15                         ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 18:31                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 18:25                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 18:26                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-11 19:33                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-12 20:22                           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-12 21:18                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-12 21:54                               ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 21:59                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-12 16:27                       ` David Laight
2018-01-12 17:55                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 19:36                           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-11 18:35                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11 21:49                   ` Willy Tarreau

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