From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 20:45:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180123204552.14040f98@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bb364dbb-4f16-56ab-c306-d96edea94dad@citrix.com>
> > static int in_order_cpu(void)
> > {
> > /* Processors with CPU id etc */
> > if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_in_order))
> > return 1;
> > /* Other rules here */
> > return 0;
> > }
>
> Why does in-order vs out-of-order matter?
>
> There are leaky SP3 gadgets which satisfy in-order requirements, so long
> as the processor is capable of speculating 3 instructions past an
> unresolved branch.
>
> What would (at a guess) save an in-order speculative processor from
> being vulnerable is if memory reads are issued and resolve in program
> order, but in that case, it is not the in-order property of the
> processor which makes it safe.
Fair point - I should rename it cpu_speculates(). The atoms in that
list don't speculate.
Alan
[My Cyrix 6x86 had a different kind of meltdown problem....]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-23 20:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-23 16:52 [PATCH v2 0/5] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24 1:23 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-24 1:28 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24 8:13 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 8:39 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-24 8:40 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:27 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:31 ` Greg KH
2018-01-23 18:48 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:12 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24 1:21 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24 1:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:44 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 18:45 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 19:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-23 20:45 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2018-01-23 20:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-23 20:50 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:25 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:07 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 17:42 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 18:40 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 18:59 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 19:37 ` David Woodhouse
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180123204552.14040f98@alans-desktop \
--to=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.