From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:57680 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752303AbeBBPtx (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Feb 2018 10:49:53 -0500 Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 10:49:52 -0500 To: Boaz Harrosh Cc: Chuck Lever , lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel , Ric Wheeler , Jan Kara , Steven Whitehouse , coughlan@redhat.com, Jeff Moyer , Sage Weil , Miklos Szeredi , Andy Rudof , Anna Schumaker , Amir Goldstein , Stephen Bates , Amit Golander , Sagi Manole , Shachar Sharon , Josef Bacik Subject: Re: [LSF/MM TOPIC ATTEND][RFD] ZUFS - Zero-copy User-mode File System Message-ID: <20180202154952.GA3875@fieldses.org> References: <8d119597-4543-c6a4-917f-14f4f4a6a855@netapp.com> <05004066-1071-4244-3b6c-318b34f3f16b@netapp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <05004066-1071-4244-3b6c-318b34f3f16b@netapp.com> From: bfields@fieldses.org (J. Bruce Fields) Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Thu, Feb 01, 2018 at 08:59:18PM +0200, Boaz Harrosh wrote: > On 01/02/18 20:34, Chuck Lever wrote: <> > > This work was also presented at the SNIA Persistent Memory Summit > > last week. The use case of course is providing a user space > > platform for the development and deployment of memory-based file > > systems. The value-add of this kind of file system is ultra-low > > latency, which is a challenge for the current most popular such > > framework, FUSE. > > > > To start, I can think of three areas where specific questions might > > be entertained by LSF/MM attendees: > > > > - Spectre mitigations make this whole "user space filesystem" > > arrangement even slower, thanks to additional context switches > > between user space and the kernel. I think you're referring to the KPTI patches, which address Meltdown, not Spectre. > What about a different interface for a "trusted" binary with "Spectre > mitigation" off. I know Redhat guys have a project where they want to > sign and verify by Kernel all systemd /sbin/* binaries. If these > binaries have such an hardened trust could we make them faster? (ie > back to regular speed) I don't think that helps. --b.