diff for duplicates of <20180214154255.GA3087@mail.hallyn.com> diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt index fdcb01b..928b40e 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N1/1.txt @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com): +Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com): > On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 09:16 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: -> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com): +> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com): > > > On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 08:49 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: -> > > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com): +> > > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com): > > > > > Files on untrusted filesystems, such as fuse, can change at any time, > > > > > making the measurement(s) and by extension signature verification > > > > > meaningless. @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com): > > > > messes up when mounted from init userns right? > > > > > > Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return -> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash +> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. ?IMA can calculate the file hash > > > based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on > > > subsequent reads. > > @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ INTEGRITY_FAIL. I agree you should do that. But you skip the FS_UNTRUSTED check for privileged FUSE mounts. I'm asking why that's ok. -> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu +> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus -?http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu > > > x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html > > > > > > > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy. @@ -60,3 +60,7 @@ I only didn't ack it because you're skipping the check for privileged mounts which seems wrong. -serge +-- +To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in +the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org +More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index 874b42f..bf83b73 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -4,26 +4,17 @@ "ref\01518620899.5667.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" "ref\020180214151637.GA2671@mail.hallyn.com\0" "ref\01518622569.5667.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0" - "From\0Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>\0" - "Subject\0Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: fail signature verification on unprivileged & untrusted filesystems\0" + "From\0serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)\0" + "Subject\0[RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: fail signature verification on unprivileged & untrusted filesystems\0" "Date\0Wed, 14 Feb 2018 09:42:55 -0600\0" - "To\0Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>\0" - "Cc\0Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>" - linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org - linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org - linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org - Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> - Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - Eric W . Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> - Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> - " Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>\0" + "To\0linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org\0" "\00:1\0" "b\0" - "Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" + "Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" "> On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 09:16 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:\n" - "> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" + "> > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" "> > > On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 08:49 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:\n" - "> > > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" + "> > > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com):\n" "> > > > > Files on untrusted filesystems, such as fuse, can change at any time,\n" "> > > > > making the measurement(s) and by extension signature verification\n" "> > > > > meaningless.\n" @@ -39,7 +30,7 @@ "> > > > messes up when mounted from init userns right?\n" "> > > \n" "> > > Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return\n" - "> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash\n" + "> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. ?IMA can calculate the file hash\n" "> > > based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on\n" "> > > subsequent reads.\n" "> > \n" @@ -55,7 +46,7 @@ "FS_UNTRUSTED check for privileged FUSE mounts. I'm asking why\n" "that's ok.\n" "\n" - "> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu\n" + "> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus -?http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu\n" "> > > x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html\n" "> > > \n" "> > > > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy.\n" @@ -80,6 +71,10 @@ "I only didn't ack it because you're skipping the check for privileged\n" "mounts which seems wrong.\n" "\n" - -serge + "-serge\n" + "--\n" + "To unsubscribe from this list: send the line \"unsubscribe linux-security-module\" in\n" + "the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org\n" + More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -f92d076af2bd3f6ad2eaf7733d92bbec91033466e8f034251dca82cd8d741676 +a734170d1c286a5f9c58ee40c886496b15c98f997a71dc32ad543784fcbbe214
diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N2/1.txt index fdcb01b..45fb0a2 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N2/1.txt @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com): > > > > messes up when mounted from init userns right? > > > > > > Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return -> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash +> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. �IMA can calculate the file hash > > > based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on > > > subsequent reads. > > @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ INTEGRITY_FAIL. I agree you should do that. But you skip the FS_UNTRUSTED check for privileged FUSE mounts. I'm asking why that's ok. -> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu +> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus -�http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu > > > x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html > > > > > > > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy. diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N2/content_digest index 874b42f..d93aecf 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N2/content_digest @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ "> > > > messes up when mounted from init userns right?\n" "> > > \n" "> > > Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return\n" - "> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash\n" + "> > > whatever it wants, whenever it wants. \303\257\302\277\302\275IMA can calculate the file hash\n" "> > > based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on\n" "> > > subsequent reads.\n" "> > \n" @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ "FS_UNTRUSTED check for privileged FUSE mounts. I'm asking why\n" "that's ok.\n" "\n" - "> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu\n" + "> > > Refer to the discussion with Linus -\303\257\302\277\302\275http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu\n" "> > > x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html\n" "> > > \n" "> > > > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy.\n" @@ -82,4 +82,4 @@ "\n" -serge -f92d076af2bd3f6ad2eaf7733d92bbec91033466e8f034251dca82cd8d741676 +b9ea4fba42f5235839e2244fdf6dc0264ce3f907041374b648635b968f8885ba
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