From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon) Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 17:18:31 +0000 Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 In-Reply-To: <20180214113645.16793-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> References: <20180214113645.16793-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> <20180214113645.16793-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Message-ID: <20180305171831.GB12869@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:36:44AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of > ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a > 4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been > read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by > a properly functioning compiler) Does the workaround currently implemented in the linker also make this same assumption? If not, I'm a little wary that we're making an assumption about compiler behaviour with no way to detect whether its been violated or not. > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c > index ea640f92fe5a..93b808056cb4 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/module-plts.c > @@ -41,6 +41,46 @@ u64 module_emit_plt_entry(struct module *mod, void *loc, const Elf64_Rela *rela, > return (u64)&plt[i]; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419 > +u64 module_emit_adrp_veneer(struct module *mod, void *loc, u64 val) > +{ > + struct mod_plt_sec *pltsec = !in_init(mod, loc) ? &mod->arch.core : > + &mod->arch.init; > + struct plt_entry *plt = (struct plt_entry *)pltsec->plt->sh_addr; > + int i = pltsec->plt_num_entries++; > + u32 mov0, mov1, mov2, br; > + int rd; > + > + BUG_ON(pltsec->plt_num_entries > pltsec->plt_max_entries); I'd prefer just to fail loading the module, but I see we already have a BUG_ON for the existing PLT code. Oh well. > + > + /* get the destination register of the ADRP instruction */ > + rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, > + le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)loc)); > + > + /* generate the veneer instructions */ > + mov0 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)~val, 0, > + AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT, > + AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_INVERSE); > + mov1 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 16), 16, > + AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT, > + AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP); > + mov2 = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, (u16)(val >> 32), 32, > + AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT, > + AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_KEEP); > + br = aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm((u64)&plt[i].br, (u64)loc + 4, > + AARCH64_INSN_BRANCH_NOLINK); > + > + plt[i] = (struct plt_entry){ > + cpu_to_le32(mov0), > + cpu_to_le32(mov1), > + cpu_to_le32(mov2), > + cpu_to_le32(br) > + }; > + > + return (u64)&plt[i]; > +} > +#endif > + > #define cmp_3way(a,b) ((a) < (b) ? -1 : (a) > (b)) > > static int cmp_rela(const void *a, const void *b) > @@ -68,16 +108,21 @@ static bool duplicate_rel(const Elf64_Rela *rela, int num) > } > > static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num, > - Elf64_Word dstidx) > + Elf64_Word dstidx, Elf_Shdr *dstsec) > { > unsigned int ret = 0; > Elf64_Sym *s; > int i; > > for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { > + u64 min_align; > + > switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela[i].r_info)) { > case R_AARCH64_JUMP26: > case R_AARCH64_CALL26: > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) > + break; > + > /* > * We only have to consider branch targets that resolve > * to symbols that are defined in a different section. > @@ -109,6 +154,31 @@ static unsigned int count_plts(Elf64_Sym *syms, Elf64_Rela *rela, int num, > if (rela[i].r_addend != 0 || !duplicate_rel(rela, i)) > ret++; > break; > + case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC: > + case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21: > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419)) > + break; > + > + /* > + * Determine the minimal safe alignment for this ADRP > + * instruction: the section alignment at which it is > + * guaranteed not to appear at a vulnerable offset. > + */ > + min_align = 2 << ffz(rela[i].r_offset | 0x7); I'm struggling to decipher this, can you give me a hint please? Why 0x7? Is the "2" because of the two vulnerable offsets? Will