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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2018 14:03:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180326120321.GD4129@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180326115246.GA4147@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 01:52:46PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:

> That now looks like:
> 
> struct task_struct {
>         struct thread_info         thread_info;          /*     0    16 */
>         volatile long int          state;                /*    16     8 */
> 
>         /* XXX 40 bytes hole, try to pack */
> 
>         /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
>         struct {
>                 void *             stack;                /*    64     8 */
>                 atomic_t           usage;                /*    72     4 */
>                 unsigned int       flags;                /*    76     4 */
>                 unsigned int       ptrace;               /*    80     4 */
>                 struct llist_node  wake_entry;           /*    88     8 */
> 
> 
> Can we please undo this crap?

The below gets rid of that nonsense.

diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index e2c7f4369eff..767cf74d61f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -242,6 +242,15 @@
 #if defined(RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 #define __randomize_layout __attribute__((randomize_layout))
 #define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout))
+/*
+ * RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN wants to use an anonymous struct, but it is only
+ * possible since GCC 4.6. To provide as much build testing coverage
+ * as possible, this is used for all GCC 4.6+ builds, and not just on
+ * RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN builds.
+ */
+#define randomized_struct_fields_start	struct {
+#define randomized_struct_fields_end	} __randomize_layout;
+
 #endif
 
 #endif /* GCC_VERSION >= 40500 */
@@ -256,15 +265,6 @@
  */
 #define __visible	__attribute__((externally_visible))
 
-/*
- * RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN wants to use an anonymous struct, but it is only
- * possible since GCC 4.6. To provide as much build testing coverage
- * as possible, this is used for all GCC 4.6+ builds, and not just on
- * RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN builds.
- */
-#define randomized_struct_fields_start	struct {
-#define randomized_struct_fields_end	} __randomize_layout;
-
 #endif /* GCC_VERSION >= 40600 */
 
 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-26 12:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-19 20:56 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56   ` Kees Cook
2018-03-26 11:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-26 12:03     ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-03-26 17:43       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20  6:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-20  6:56     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-20 19:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-20 19:25       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:35       ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-20 20:35         ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-20 20:52         ` [kernel-hardening] " Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-20 20:52           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-20 21:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-20 21:34           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-22 23:57           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-22 23:57             ` Kees Cook
2017-06-22 23:59             ` [kernel-hardening] " Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-22 23:59               ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-06-23  0:20               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-23  0:20                 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-06-19 20:56   ` Kees Cook

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