From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com,
ashok.raj@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com, youquan.song@linux.intel.com,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 20/24] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 16:26:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180425142612.GF25610@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1524021512-24022-21-git-send-email-youquan.song@intel.com>
On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 11:18:28AM +0800, Youquan Song wrote:
> From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
>
> (cherry picked from commit d28b387fb74da95d69d2615732f50cceb38e9a4d)
>
> [ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ]
>
> Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
> guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
> be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.
>
> To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for
> guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring
> when a non-zero is written to it.
>
> No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
> may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
> if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.
>
> [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]
>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com> [v4.4 backport]
>
> Conflicts:
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
yet again...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-25 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-18 3:18 [PATCH 00/24] Backport Speculation Control support for 4.4 Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 03/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 04/24] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 05/24] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 06/24] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Youquan Song
2018-04-18 11:01 ` Jack Wang
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 07/24] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 08/24] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 09/24] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 12/24] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 15/24] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:25 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 16/24] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:25 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 17/24] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:25 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 18/24] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:25 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 19/24] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:26 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 20/24] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:26 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 21/24] KVM/SVM: " Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 22/24] KVM/x86: Remove indirect MSR op calls from SPEC_CTRL Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:26 ` Greg KH
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 23/24] KVM/VMX: Optimize vmx_vcpu_run() and svm_vcpu_run() by marking the RDMSR path as unlikely() Youquan Song
2018-04-18 3:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors Youquan Song
2018-04-25 14:28 ` [PATCH 00/24] Backport Speculation Control support for 4.4 Greg KH
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-17 4:26 [PATCH 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Youquan Song
2018-04-17 4:27 ` [PATCH 20/24] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Youquan Song
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