From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, avagin@virtuozzo.com,
ktkhai@virtuozzo.com, serge@hallyn.com,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 2/2 v3] netns: restrict uevents
Date: Sat, 28 Apr 2018 21:13:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180428191304.GB13787@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87po2k7gt9.fsf@xmission.com>
On Fri, Apr 27, 2018 at 11:30:26AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> writes:
> > ---
> > lib/kobject_uevent.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> > 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> > index c3cb110f663b..d8ce5e6d83af 100644
> > --- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> > +++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> >
> > +static int uevent_net_broadcast_tagged(struct sock *usk,
> > + struct kobj_uevent_env *env,
> > + const char *action_string,
> > + const char *devpath)
> > +{
> > + struct user_namespace *owning_user_ns = sock_net(usk)->user_ns;
> > + struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + skb = alloc_uevent_skb(env, action_string, devpath);
> > + if (!skb)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + /* fix credentials */
> > + if (owning_user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
>
> Nit: This test is just a performance optimization as such is not
> necessary. That is we can safely unconditionally set the
> credentials this way.
alloc_uevent_skb() will now set
parms = &NETLINK_CB(skb);
parms->creds.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
parms->creds.gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
parms->dst_group = 1;
parms->portid = 0;
explicitly. So repeating that initialization unconditionally here does
not make sense to me. Also, this hits map_uid_down() in user_namespace.c
which is a known-hotpath (Remember the extensive testing we did back for
uidmap limit bumping from 5 to 340.). And even though it might not
matter much in this case there's no need to hit this code. The condition
also make it obvious that only non-initial user namespace uevent sockets
need fixing.
Christian
>
> > + struct netlink_skb_parms *parms = &NETLINK_CB(skb);
> > + kuid_t root_uid;
> > + kgid_t root_gid;
> > +
> > + /* fix uid */
> > + root_uid = make_kuid(owning_user_ns, 0);
> > + if (!uid_valid(root_uid))
> > + root_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
> > + parms->creds.uid = root_uid;
> > +
> > + /* fix gid */
> > + root_gid = make_kgid(owning_user_ns, 0);
> > + if (!gid_valid(root_gid))
> > + root_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
> > + parms->creds.gid = root_gid;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = netlink_broadcast(usk, skb, 0, 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + /* ENOBUFS should be handled in userspace */
> > + if (ret == -ENOBUFS || ret == -ESRCH)
> > + ret = 0;
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +#endif
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-28 19:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-27 10:23 [PATCH net-next 0/2] netns: uevent filtering Christian Brauner
2018-04-27 10:23 ` [PATCH net-next 1/2 v3] uevent: add alloc_uevent_skb() helper Christian Brauner
2018-04-27 16:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-28 19:09 ` Christian Brauner
2018-04-27 10:23 ` [PATCH net-next 2/2 v3] netns: restrict uevents Christian Brauner
2018-04-27 16:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-28 19:13 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2018-04-27 16:27 ` [PATCH net-next 0/2] netns: uevent filtering Eric W. Biederman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180428191304.GB13787@gmail.com \
--to=christian.brauner@canonical.com \
--cc=avagin@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=ktkhai@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.