From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZpuKE3+EzCbTKmCHEBA3kTJb0spG+bOOXWO4g+pjq7tOLwMAwUzgQ6mC5Pc9FFsejJPHf0N ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1525116434; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=rD6JGbERR4u13+gafzRMKUERg8ZVCPkLqqGKF96HHocvPl9Ogcc8vReJ9jAR/qStgZ GJ/kan2omJOo6wK1sP4m2AHWjz/YqgWpiWAKmXnIEhA1EA+tXY71gWyDAsV1oAXYAAd3 sPF7zN9VBqgb+VAdBZTSVEzErEoY31DhvQ/lYHHZs/aeXovY75JSTPZGYq1B+Th8yNJT ma6hDd3PjI0PTWghzSkjnH3A5Qj2SnXB/5qouIydiKhHRdkvx6boxcQ2BbSszV5XDQP0 2qvyhpLFB0qziT4Yo7G0qiP0VrR+mDHO9p2agxFjzp5ffvVvsR5uC5FS6r+dI7BEgApJ Up2w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date :subject:cc:to:from:dmarc-filter:arc-authentication-results; bh=MzfCqD0VH5FV1UgibykHL4DWPb5KFKhtgWjA9sYxKWM=; b=xZrG1PmwZvB1YFdozzlpCmGHYLOKBKJChg2nH80LuJqol1vItPZ4xFjLee+m2KGlCh nfPPmeyIt4XsCbVESp/ssnj7GUqyo9DZi/eBGecKF7Z8qvBILyprd4kix5XtxXYfnG6u 4zgxalFCSzH00hyBQsCN3bIbS2rsx/Xf814u6dw3saDc7QPokjBy1LYZw4AqO/83f7oA OGgj5kp07IaKwQ4IjFF4wKAdOmUiu2Cknz8cpmWaMYJs8Hb8mLQmKT+tohzeSwlS+zTn PEZCadq08Fd82Vb8aUxcuOBaAlGcLI0tQ3GNfd3VGGBuiJJ/n6U7OeMHob8QmfKf/rvX 7eBQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of srs0=k66p=ht=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org designates 198.145.29.99 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=SRS0=K66P=HT=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of srs0=k66p=ht=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org designates 198.145.29.99 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=SRS0=K66P=HT=linuxfoundation.org=gregkh@kernel.org DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7767622DCC Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.14 39/91] ALSA: hdspm: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 12:24:21 -0700 Message-Id: <20180430184006.201800944@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180430184004.216234025@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180430184004.216234025@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-LABELS: =?utf-8?b?IlxcU2VudCI=?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1599200425501203379?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1599200489914436580?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Takashi Iwai commit 10513142a7114d251670361ad40cba2c61403406 upstream. As recently Smatch suggested, a couple of places in HDSP MADI driver may expand the array directly from the user-space value with speculation: sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c:5717 snd_hdspm_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdspm->channel_map_out' (local cap) sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c:5734 snd_hdspm_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdspm->channel_map_in' (local cap) This patch puts array_index_nospec() for hardening against them. BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2 Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c +++ b/sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -5698,40 +5699,43 @@ static int snd_hdspm_channel_info(struct struct snd_pcm_channel_info *info) { struct hdspm *hdspm = snd_pcm_substream_chip(substream); + unsigned int channel = info->channel; if (substream->stream == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK) { - if (snd_BUG_ON(info->channel >= hdspm->max_channels_out)) { + if (snd_BUG_ON(channel >= hdspm->max_channels_out)) { dev_info(hdspm->card->dev, "snd_hdspm_channel_info: output channel out of range (%d)\n", - info->channel); + channel); return -EINVAL; } - if (hdspm->channel_map_out[info->channel] < 0) { + channel = array_index_nospec(channel, hdspm->max_channels_out); + if (hdspm->channel_map_out[channel] < 0) { dev_info(hdspm->card->dev, "snd_hdspm_channel_info: output channel %d mapped out\n", - info->channel); + channel); return -EINVAL; } - info->offset = hdspm->channel_map_out[info->channel] * + info->offset = hdspm->channel_map_out[channel] * HDSPM_CHANNEL_BUFFER_BYTES; } else { - if (snd_BUG_ON(info->channel >= hdspm->max_channels_in)) { + if (snd_BUG_ON(channel >= hdspm->max_channels_in)) { dev_info(hdspm->card->dev, "snd_hdspm_channel_info: input channel out of range (%d)\n", - info->channel); + channel); return -EINVAL; } - if (hdspm->channel_map_in[info->channel] < 0) { + channel = array_index_nospec(channel, hdspm->max_channels_in); + if (hdspm->channel_map_in[channel] < 0) { dev_info(hdspm->card->dev, "snd_hdspm_channel_info: input channel %d mapped out\n", - info->channel); + channel); return -EINVAL; } - info->offset = hdspm->channel_map_in[info->channel] * + info->offset = hdspm->channel_map_in[channel] * HDSPM_CHANNEL_BUFFER_BYTES; }