From: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 16:27:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180503232757.GF6017@outflux.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525383411.git.dave.hansen@intel.com>
On Thu, May 03, 2018 at 03:29:43PM -0700, speck for Dave Hansen wrote:
> BPF is a potential source of gadgets that can be used for memory
> diambiguation-based attacks. To help mitigate these, we enable
> the bit in SPEC_CTRL which enables the reduced (memory)
> speculation mode on the processor when runing BPF code.
Do you mean eBPF, or even cBPF? For example, can gadgets be built using the
BPF used in seccomp()? Prior speculation flaws weren't exposed there, so
it might be possible (though ironic given my other seccomp series) to not
trigger this for seccomp BPF execution... :P
-Kees
--
Kees Cook @outflux.net
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-03 23:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-03 22:29 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/5] SSB extra 2 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/5] SSB extra 3 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra 1 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/5] SSB extra 5 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra 4 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 23:27 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-05-04 1:37 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0 Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-23 7:17 ` [MODERATED] cBPF affectedness (was Re: [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0) Jiri Kosina
2018-05-23 13:56 ` [MODERATED] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-05-04 9:20 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 1/5] SSB extra 2 Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-04 14:04 ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-04 15:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-04 13:33 ` [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 14:22 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 14:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:04 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-04 16:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:28 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-04 16:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:43 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 18:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 8:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 21:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 22:40 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-05-07 6:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 17:01 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/5] SSB extra 5 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-21 9:56 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra 4 Jiri Kosina
2018-05-21 13:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
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