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Date: Wed, 30 May 2018 14:10:30 -0700
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 2/2] L1TF KVM 2
Message-ID: <20180530211030.GH30764@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
References: <20180529194214.2600-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
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> Right, but you really have to make a judgement whether this leak is useful
> and can be orchestrated by the attacker in the guest. If it's just the
> theoretical cornercase with no practical attack surface then you really can
> leave that as an exercise for ivory tower people.

We care about user data and kernel secrets like keys.

NMIs don't have either.

(except for profile NMIs, but they only have the data of what
you just interrupted)

Same for machine checks etc. 

In fact most hard interrupts are likely uninteresting (except those
that copy user data), although soft interrupts may not be.

-Andi