From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=192.55.52.93; helo=mga11.intel.com; envelope-from=vernon.mauery@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40xdSw3TgXzDrp0 for ; Fri, 1 Jun 2018 05:54:03 +1000 (AEST) X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 31 May 2018 12:53:48 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.49,463,1520924400"; d="scan'208";a="45469746" Received: from mauery.jf.intel.com (HELO mauery) ([10.7.150.73]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 31 May 2018 12:53:48 -0700 Date: Thu, 31 May 2018 12:53:48 -0700 From: Vernon Mauery To: Stewart Smith Cc: Nancy Yuen , OpenBMC Maillist Subject: Re: OpenBMC Security Working Group Kick Off Message-ID: <20180531195348.GG105329@mauery> References: <87efhs43uo.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87efhs43uo.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 31 May 2018 19:54:09 -0000 On 31-May-2018 06:38 PM, Stewart Smith wrote: >Nancy Yuen writes: >> The OpenBMC Security Work Group kick off meeting is scheduled for Thurs May >> 31, 9AM PDT. This first meeting is by invite only. Please email me if you >> are interested in participating in this working group. > >Would topics like "security of the BMC from a hostile host" be part of >this? I would vote yes. From a platform architecture, while the pre-boot communications from the Host might be more trusted, after the OS boots, the host should be considered hostile. >A design of OpenPOWER systems is that the BMC and the Host don't have to >trust each other, and this should extend to a host that's hostile >towards the BMC. I agree. This is just a plain good design choice. :) --Vernon >I'd be surprised if we didn't find bugs in both mboxd and host ipmi if >we started fuzzing those interfaces. > >-- >Stewart Smith >OPAL Architect, IBM. >