From: Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
George Dunlap <dunlapg@umich.edu>,
committers@xenproject.org, security@xenproject.org,
xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Andrew Halley <andrew.halley@citrix.com>,
Steven Haigh <netwiz@crc.id.au>,
Ajey Kulkarni <Ajey.Kulkarni@rackspace.com>
Subject: Re: Xen Project Security Process Whitepaper v1 is ready for community review
Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2018 14:07:57 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180605120757.GL23079@mail-itl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5B1677B002000078001C8417@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
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On Tue, Jun 05, 2018 at 05:44:48AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 05.06.18 at 13:03, <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 05, 2018 at 11:34:28AM +0100, George Dunlap wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 3:55 PM, Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> > 2.2.3 B. Git baseline of patches
> >> > This created quite a bit of discussion and we did learn a few things:
> >> > * From the thread, having to cherry pick a small (around 5-6) patches have
> > to be cherry-picked for XSAs to apply to tarballs this appears to be seen as
> > OK for most users. More patches are a problem
> >> > * Recently this issue has become much worse, because some security fixes
> > (or pre-requisites for them) have been developed in public and some XSAs
> > required significant backporting to be able to be run
> >> > * A point release has usually <50% security fixes
> >> > * There is no appetite amongst existing point release maintainers to
> > maintain a staging branch and an XSA + pre-requisites only branch
> >> >
> >> > In other words, we are at a stale-mate. I see two ways around it
> >> > a) Find an additional volunteer to maintain XSA + pre-requisites only
> > branches for releases
> >> > b) Find some tooling/test based solution which exposes issues applying XSAs
> > on the last releases of a staging branch for a point release. This is a
> > little bit of a half-baked idea, but it may be worthwhile looking into.
> >> > For example, we could create an OSSTEST, that checks out the last released
> > stable branch and applies outstanding XSAs and pre-requisites based on the
> > meta-info to it (e.g. via xsatool or a variant thereof). This test would
> > fail, if an XSA does not apply, which implies that the pre-requisites are
> > incomplete. If all XSAs apply, we can run the full OSSTEST on it. The test
> > could also produce a list of git commits from staging that include XSAs and
> > pre-requisites that can be applied in order. This should in theory - if
> > doable - help downstreams which are struggling with this problem, while
> > flagging up potential issues to stable maintainers early. Any thoughts? Would
> > this be workable and if so, would it actually help?
> >>
> >> Here's a question: What would it take for most downstreams to update
> >> to staging when a public release was made?
> >>
> >> Suppose we did this:
> >> 1. When we predisclose an issue, freeze the stable branches until the
> >> embargo lifts -- no backports.
> >> 2. When the embargo lifts, addition to the patches, we release a new
> >> point release, complete with signed tag and tarball.
> >> 3. We only do non-security point releases if we go 4 months without a
> >> security-prompted point release.
> >
> > IMO this would significantly ease handling of XSAs, at least for us.
> > This does mean we'll need to test things using stable branch (not
> > previous point release) during embargo period - as the point release
> > would be available only after lifting the embargo, but I think that's
> > manageable.
> >
> > What if at the predisclose time there are some commits in staging (not
> > stable), which breaks things (in terms of osstest)? Would them be
> > bypassed (XSA applied on top of stable, then rebase staging on top of
> > new stable)? Or something else?
>
> I don't think we should get into the business of re-basing any of the
> main branches of xen.git. If anything, then merging. But I further
> think we also shouldn't break the strict staging -> stable workflow
> with the osstest push gate in between. Some delay between public
> disclosure and release of the new stable version will hence be
> unavoidable. (Just take the current situation as an example, where
> we're blocked on an osstest issue [according to my investigation, at
> least] with two stable releases - we simply have to wait for the
> osstest issue to be dealt with first, and for the pushes of the
> branches then to eventually happen.)
Makes sense. Does it mean in all the cases point release would happen
with a delay from XSA public release? How long does it take for osstest
to push things (assuming no problems)?
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-05 12:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-04 14:55 Xen Project Security Process Whitepaper v1 is ready for community review Lars Kurth
2018-06-05 10:34 ` George Dunlap
2018-06-05 11:03 ` Marek Marczykowski
2018-06-05 11:44 ` Jan Beulich
2018-06-05 12:07 ` Marek Marczykowski [this message]
2018-06-05 12:58 ` Jan Beulich
2018-06-27 4:05 ` Steven Haigh
2018-06-27 9:19 ` Jan Beulich
2018-06-27 14:47 ` Steven Haigh
2018-06-28 1:57 ` Lars Kurth
2018-07-02 18:11 ` Lars Kurth
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