From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
labbott@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 10:26:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180718142625.GA5942@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <37046662f2b38f98854abfa1b5868a27c3fa0888.camel@opteya.com>
On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 09:22:13AM +0200, Yann Droneaud wrote:
>
> The text message should explain this is only relevant during
> initialization / early boot.
>
> The config option name should state this.
There are other workarounds for hangs that happen after initialization
/ early boot, yes. They are of varying levels of quality / safely,
but that's neither here nor there.
However, enabling config option means that the CRNG will be
initialized with potentially information available to the CPU
manufacturer and/or Nation States, and this persists *after*
initialization / early boot. So to say, "we're perfectly safe after
we leave initialization / early boot" is not true.
So I'd much rather make it clear that we are trusting the CPU
manufacturer far more than just during early boot.
Cheers,
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-18 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-18 1:43 [PATCH] random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng Theodore Ts'o
2018-07-18 1:51 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-18 15:14 ` Sandy Harris
2018-07-18 17:36 ` [PATCH] random: addu " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-18 20:22 ` Sandy Harris
2018-07-19 14:21 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-19 20:17 ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 17:36 ` [PATCH] random: add " Ken Moffat
2018-07-19 0:19 ` Ken Moffat
2018-07-18 5:09 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-07-18 6:46 ` Jeffrey Walton
2018-07-18 7:22 ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 14:26 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2018-07-18 15:29 ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 15:29 ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 19:17 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-04 21:52 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-05 0:25 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-05 0:28 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-05 9:44 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-20 19:09 ` Laura Abbott
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