Re: Reflections on WireGuard Design Goals

[Roman Mamedov <rm@romanrm.net>]

On Fri, 10 Aug 2018 14:35:14 +0100
Brian Candler <b.candler@pobox.com> wrote:

>  From my point of view, the only thing which makes me uncomfortable=20
> about wireguard is the lack of any second authentication factor. Your=20
> private key is embedded in a plaintext file in your device (e.g.=20
> laptop), not even protected with a passphrase.=C2=A0 Anyone who gains acc=
ess=20
> to that laptop is able to establish wireguard connections.
>=20
> Of course, it can be argued that the laptop holds other information=20
> which is more valuable that the wireguard key, therefore you should=20
> concentrate on properly securing the laptop itself (*). Furthermore, to=20
> be able to talk to the wireguard kernel module you're already root, and=20
> therefore have all sorts of malicious options available to you. etc etc
>=20
> But I'd feel a lot happier if a second level of authentication were=20
> required to establish a wireguard connection, if no packets had been=20
> flowing for more than a configurable amount of time - say, an hour. It=20
> would give some comfort around lost/stolen devices.

Couldn't you just encrypt your home directory? Or even the root FS entirely.
Either of those should be a must on a portable device storing valuable
information.

--=20
With respect,
Roman