From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org, kdeus@google.com,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] NFC: Fix possible memory corruption when handling SHDLC I-Frame commands
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 11:21:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814092135.GA10316@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180813223910.26276-1-surenb@google.com>
On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 03:39:08PM -0700, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> When handling SHDLC I-Frame commands "pipe" field used for indexing
> into an array should be checked before usage. If left unchecked it
> might access memory outside of the array of size NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES(127).
>
> Malformed NFC HCI frames could be injected by a malicious NFC device
> communicating with the device being attacked (remote attack vector),
> or even by an attacker with physical access to the I2C bus such that
> they could influence the data transfers on that bus (local attack vector).
> skb->data is controlled by the attacker and has only been sanitized in
> the most trivial ways (CRC check), therefore we can consider the
> create_info struct and all of its members to tainted. 'create_info->pipe'
> with max value of 255 (uint8) is used to take an offset of the
> hdev->pipes array of 127 elements which can lead to OOB write.
>
> Suggested-by: Kevin Deus <kdeus@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-14 12:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-13 22:39 [PATCH 1/1] NFC: Fix possible memory corruption when handling SHDLC I-Frame commands Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-14 0:28 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-14 9:21 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-08-14 9:54 ` Dan Carpenter
2018-08-14 16:57 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-14 20:26 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-14 20:33 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-14 20:55 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-14 21:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-14 21:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-14 22:19 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-14 22:38 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-15 8:29 ` Dan Carpenter
2018-08-15 16:40 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-15 16:40 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2018-08-17 12:06 ` Dan Carpenter
2018-08-17 14:47 ` Dan Carpenter
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