From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Sathya Prakash <sathya.prakash@broadcom.com>,
Chaitra P B <chaitra.basappa@broadcom.com>,
Suganath Prabu Subramani <suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com>
Cc: MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptctl: fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 13:42:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180816184254.GA7923@embeddedor.com> (raw)
karg->hdr.port is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:1360 mptctl_getiocinfo() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ioc->pfacts' [r]
Fix this by sanitizing karg->hdr.port before indirectly using it to index
ioc->pfacts
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
Notice that the '1 + 1' thing is intentional for clarity purposes.
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
index 8d22d61..afc6979 100644
--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
+++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <scsi/scsi.h>
#include <scsi/scsi_cmnd.h>
@@ -1306,7 +1307,7 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
kfree(karg);
return -EINVAL;
}
- port = karg->hdr.port;
+ port = array_index_nospec(karg->hdr.port, 1 + 1);
karg->port = port;
pdev = (struct pci_dev *) ioc->pcidev;
--
2.7.4
reply other threads:[~2018-08-16 18:42 UTC|newest]
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