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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] seccomp: set the seccomp filter to all threads
Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2018 17:43:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180822164336.GS12750@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMxuvaxEM4DjCq=AKEEg3cTJzoo1PX9N5R6p1_+wvCY=TMtgqQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 06:19:16PM +0200, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> Hi
> 
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On 08/22/2018 10:58 AM, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> >
> >>> At this point you might as well not bother using seccomp at all. The
> >>> thread that is confined merely needs to scribble something into the
> >>> stack of the unconfined thread and now it can do whatever it wants.
> >>
> >>
> >> Actually, that message is incorrect, it should rather be "not all
> >> threads will be filtered" (as described in commit message).
> >>
> >>> IMHO we need to find a way to get the policy to apply to those other
> >>> threads.
> >>
> >>
> >> That's what the patch is about ;)
> >
> >
> > In other words, this patch is patching the gaping security hole that already
> > exists, but...
> >
> >>>> +++ b/qemu-options.hx
> >>>> @@ -3864,6 +3864,8 @@ Disable set*uid|gid system calls
> >>>>   Disable *fork and execve
> >>>>   @item resourcecontrol=@var{string}
> >>>>   Disable process affinity and schedular priority
> >>>> +@item tsync=@var{bool}
> >>>> +Apply seccomp filter to all threads (default is auto, and will warn if
> >>>> fail)
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> IMHO this should never exist, as setting "tsync" to anything other
> >>> than "yes", is akin to just running without any sandbox.
> >>
> >>
> >> Then we should just fail -sandbox on those systems.
> >
> >
> > ...leaving the backdoor open.  Yes, we should instead fix things to hard
> > fail when -sandbox cannot fully protect the process, rather than adding a
> > tsync=off backdoor to permit execution in spite of the insecurity.
> 
> Ok, -sandbox will now require libseccomp 2.2.0 (not available in
> Debian oldstable - so it will fail at configure time) and kernel >=
> 3.17 (error during start). If that sounds ok, I'll update the series.

Hmm, that will cause seccomp to be unusable for RHEL-7, prior to
the 7.5 kernel, which has complications wrt libvirt using -sandbox
by default.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-22 16:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-22 14:29 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/3] seccomp fixes Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/3] seccomp: use SIGSYS signal instead of killing the thread Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp: prefer SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS if available Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] seccomp: set the seccomp filter to all threads Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 15:46   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 15:58     ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:06       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:37         ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:39           ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:46             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:51           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:07       ` Eric Blake
2018-08-22 16:19         ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:43           ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2018-08-22 16:53             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 15:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/3] seccomp fixes Eduardo Otubo

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