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From: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>,
	Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>, TongZhang <ztong@vt.edu>,
	linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Wenbo Shen <shenwenbosmile@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Leaking Path in XFS's ioctl interface(missing LSM check)
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 08:45:28 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181001224528.GI18567@dastard> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1810020608090.14406@namei.org>

On Tue, Oct 02, 2018 at 06:08:16AM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 1 Oct 2018, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> 
> > If we /did/ replace CAP_SYS_ADMIN checking with a pile of LSM hooks,
> 
> Not sure we'd need a pile of hooks, what about just "read" and "write" 
> storage admin?
> 
> Or even two new capabilities along these lines, which we convert existing 
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN etc. to?

So instead of having hundreds of management ioctls under
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, we'd now have hundreds of non-storage ioctls under
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and hundreds of storage ioctls under
CAP_SYS_STORAGE_ADMIN?

Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see how that improves the
situation w.r.t. locked down LSM configurations?

Cheers,

Dave.


-- 
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-01 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-26  0:51 Leaking Path in XFS's ioctl interface(missing LSM check) TongZhang
2018-09-26  0:51 ` TongZhang
2018-09-26  1:33 ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-26  1:33   ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-26 13:23   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-26 13:23     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-09-27  2:08     ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-27  2:08       ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-26 18:24   ` Alan Cox
2018-09-26 18:24     ` Alan Cox
2018-09-27  1:38     ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-27  1:38       ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-27 21:23       ` James Morris
2018-09-27 21:23         ` James Morris
2018-09-27 22:19         ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-27 22:19           ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-27 23:12           ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-27 23:12             ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-30 14:16       ` Alan Cox
2018-09-30 14:16         ` Alan Cox
2018-10-01  0:25         ` Dave Chinner
2018-10-01  0:25           ` Dave Chinner
2018-10-01 15:04           ` Alan Cox
2018-10-01 15:25             ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-10-01 22:53               ` Dave Chinner
2018-10-01 15:44             ` Darrick J. Wong
2018-10-01 20:08               ` James Morris
2018-10-01 22:45                 ` Dave Chinner [this message]
2018-10-02 19:20                   ` James Morris
2018-10-02 22:42                     ` Dave Chinner

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