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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 6/6] ubifs: Check for name being NULL while mounting
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 11:00:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181010150007.GH32006@sasha-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4196827.3PtsAkI51k@blindfold>

On Fri, Oct 05, 2018 at 06:24:42PM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>Sasha,
>
>Am Freitag, 5. Oktober 2018, 18:17:50 CEST schrieb Sasha Levin:
>> From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
>>
>> [ Upstream commit 37f31b6ca4311b94d985fb398a72e5399ad57925 ]
>>
>> The requested device name can be NULL or an empty string.
>> Check for that and refuse to continue. UBIFS has to do this manually
>> since we cannot use mount_bdev(), which checks for this condition.
>>
>> Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
>> Reported-by: syzbot+38bd0f7865e5c6379280@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
>> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
>
>I'm not sure whether it makes sense to apply this patch to stable.
>1. You need to be the real root to hit this code path.
>2. Access is read-only, for an attacker it is useless.
>
>If we look at the code:
>        if (name[0] != 'u' || name[1] != 'b' || name[2] != 'i')
>                return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
>        /* ubi:NAME method */
>        if ((name[3] == ':' || name[3] == '!') && name[4] != '\0')
>
>name can be NULL, so we access just a few bytes.
>
>Thanks,
>//richard

Hi Richard,

I wasn't really looking at it from a security perspective. My thought
process was that if a user (root or not) is doing action A, expecting
result B but instead unexpectedly sees result C then it's a bug worth
fixing in stable.

If you think it's a risky change for stable I'd be happy to drop it.


--
Thanks,
Sasha

      reply	other threads:[~2018-10-10 15:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-05 16:17 [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 1/6] selftests/efivarfs: add required kernel configs Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:17 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 2/6] mfd: omap-usb-host: Fix dts probe of children Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:17 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 3/6] stmmac: fix valid numbers of unicast filter entries Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:17 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 4/6] net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:17 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 5/6] floppy: Do not copy a kernel pointer to user memory in FDGETPRM ioctl Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:17 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 3.18 6/6] ubifs: Check for name being NULL while mounting Sasha Levin
2018-10-05 16:24   ` Richard Weinberger
2018-10-10 15:00     ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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