All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>,
	linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>,
	syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 10:02:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181114180217.195917-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181114171447.GA87768@gmail.com>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory.  Therefore, UHID_CREATE
must not be allowed in this case.

For consistency and to make sure all current and future uhid commands
are covered, apply the restriction to uhid_char_write() as a whole
rather than to UHID_CREATE specifically.

Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.

Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6+
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 drivers/hid/uhid.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
index 3c55073136064..e94c5e248b56e 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
@@ -705,6 +705,12 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 	int ret;
 	size_t len;
 
+	if (uaccess_kernel()) { /* payload may contain a __user pointer */
+		pr_err_once("%s: process %d (%s) called from kernel context, this is not allowed.\n",
+			    __func__, task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/* we need at least the "type" member of uhid_event */
 	if (count < sizeof(__u32))
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-14 18:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-11 18:26 BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) syzbot
2018-11-14  0:25 ` syzbot
2018-11-14 12:20   ` David Herrmann
2018-11-14 16:52     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-11-14 17:14       ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:02         ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2018-11-14 18:14           ` [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 18:18           ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 21:54             ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 21:55             ` [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 22:04               ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:28                 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 22:37                   ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:46                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  0:39                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-14 23:00                   ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 23:20                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  8:14                       ` Benjamin Tissoires
2018-11-15 12:06                         ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:50                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-15 12:09               ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:49                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 12:52               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:21                 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-19 13:26                   ` Jiri Kosina

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20181114180217.195917-1-ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com \
    --cc=dh.herrmann@googlemail.com \
    --cc=dtor@google.com \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jikos@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
    --cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.