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From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>,
	RDMA mailing list <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>,
	Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, ddutile@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents
Date: Sat,  2 Feb 2019 11:09:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190202090945.4106-3-leon@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190202090945.4106-1-leon@kernel.org>

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

If the MAD agents isn't allowed to manage the subnet, or fails to
register for the LSM notifier, the security context is leaked. Free the
context in these cases.

Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 402449d4a888..7662e9347238 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -710,16 +710,20 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
 						dev_name(&agent->device->dev),
 						agent->port_num);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto free_security;

 	agent->lsm_nb.notifier_call = ib_mad_agent_security_change;
 	ret = register_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto free_security;

 	agent->smp_allowed = true;
 	agent->lsm_nb_reg = true;
 	return 0;
+
+free_security:
+	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
+	return ret;
 }

 void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
--
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-02  9:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore
2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe

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