[patch V3 9/9] MDS basics 9

[Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>]

Subject: [patch V3 9/9] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.

Introduce an internal mitigation mode 'VWWERV' which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.

That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V2 -> V3: Rename mode.
---
 Documentation/x86/mds.rst        |    5 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   14 ++++++++------
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ The mitigation is invoked on kernel/user
 (idle) transitions. Depending on the mitigation mode and the system state
 the invocation can be enforced or conditional.
 
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might work. The state is reflected accordingly.
+
 According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
 itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
 data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -996,6 +996,7 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
 	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
 };
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigati
 
 static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
 	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
-	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
 };
 
 static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -236,12 +237,12 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
-			static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
-		} else {
-			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
-		}
+		else
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
 		break;
 	}
 	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
@@ -704,6 +705,7 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
 		break;
 	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
 		update_mds_branch_idle();
 		break;
 	/* Keep GCC happy */