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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 0/4] Proposed cmdline improvements
Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 19:21:38 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190304012138.gikabpafseh2swre@treble> (raw)


For MDS and SMT, I'd propose that we do something similar to what we did
for L1TF: a) add an mds=full,nosmt option; and b) add a printk warning
if SMT is enabled.  That's the first three patches.

The last patch proposes a meta-option which is intended to make it
easier for users to choose sane mitigation defaults for all the
speculative vulnerabilities at once.

Josh Poimboeuf (4):
  x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
  x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation
    decisions
  x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
  x86/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst     |  3 +
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 49 ++++++++++++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                |  6 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c              |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 68 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                             |  3 +-
 include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 +++
 kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++
 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.2

             reply	other threads:[~2019-03-04  1:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-04  1:21 Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-03-04  1:23 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  3:55   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 17:06     ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  7:30   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1 Greg KH
2019-03-04  7:45     ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04  1:24 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 2/4] 2 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  7:31   ` [MODERATED] " Greg KH
2019-03-04 17:11     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  1:24 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  3:58   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters
2019-03-04 17:17     ` [MODERATED] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-06 16:22       ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2019-03-04  7:33   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3 Greg KH
2019-03-04 17:18     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  1:25 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH RFC 4/4] 4 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-04  4:07   ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Jon Masters

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