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From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>,
	LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>,
	Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	Daniel Lustig <dlustig@nvidia.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jade Alglave <j.alglave@ucl.ac.uk>,
	Luc Maranget <luc.maranget@inria.fr>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Daniel Kroening <kroening@cs.ox.ac.uk>,
	Kernel development list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Adding plain accesses and detecting data races in the LKMM
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 11:39:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190418183919.GO14111@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44L0.1904181324420.1303-100000@iolanthe.rowland.org>

On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 01:44:36PM -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Apr 2019, Andrea Parri wrote:
> 
> > > Another question is "should the kernel permit smp_mb__{before,after}*()
> > > anywhere other than immediately before or after the primitive being
> > > strengthened?"
> > 
> > Mmh, I do think that keeping these barriers "immediately before or after
> > the primitive being strengthened" is a good practice (readability, and
> > all that), if this is what you're suggesting.
> > 
> > However, a first auditing of the callsites showed that this practice is
> > in fact not always applied, notably... ;-)
> > 
> > 	kernel/rcu/tree_exp.h:sync_exp_work_done
> > 	kernel/sched/cpupri.c:cpupri_set
> > 
> > So there appear, at least, to be some exceptions/reasons for not always
> > following it?  Thoughts?
> > 
> > BTW, while auditing these callsites, I've stumbled across the following
> > snippet (from kernel/futex.c):
> > 
> > 	*futex = newval;
> > 	sys_futex(WAKE, futex);
> >           futex_wake(futex);
> >           smp_mb(); (B)
> > 	  if (waiters)
> > 	    ...
> > 
> > where B is actually (c.f., futex_get_mm()):
> > 
> > 	atomic_inc(...->mm_count);
> > 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
> > 
> > It seems worth mentioning the fact that, AFAICT, this sequence does not
> > necessarily provide ordering when plain accesses are involved: consider,
> > e.g., the following variant of the snippet:
> > 
> > 	A:*x = 1;
> > 	/*
> > 	 * I've "ignored" the syscall, which should provide
> > 	 * (at least) a compiler barrier...
> > 	 */
> > 	atomic_inc(u);
> > 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
> > 	B:r0 = *y;
> > 
> > On x86, AFAICT, the compiler can do this:
> > 
> > 	atomic_inc(u);
> > 	A:*x = 1;
> > 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
> > 	B:r0 = *y;
> > 
> > (the implementation of atomic_inc() contains no compiler barrier), then
> > the CPU can "reorder" A and B (smp_mb__after_atomic() being #defined to
> > a compiler barrier).
> 
> Are you saying that on x86, atomic_inc() acts as a full memory barrier 
> but not as a compiler barrier, and vice versa for 
> smp_mb__after_atomic()?  Or that neither atomic_inc() nor 
> smp_mb__after_atomic() implements a full memory barrier?
> 
> Either one seems like a very dangerous situation indeed.

If I am following the macro-name breadcrumb trails correctly, x86's
atomic_inc() does have a compiler barrier.  But this is an accident
of implementation -- from what I can see, it is not required to do so.

So smb_mb__after_atomic() is only guaranteed to order the atomic_inc()
before B, not A.  To order A before B in the above example, an
smp_mb__before_atomic() is also needed.

But now that I look, LKMM looks to be stating a stronger guarantee:

	([M] ; fencerel(Before-atomic) ; [RMW] ; po? ; [M]) |
	([M] ; po? ; [RMW] ; fencerel(After-atomic) ; [M]) |
	([M] ; po? ; [LKW] ; fencerel(After-spinlock) ; [M]) |
	([M] ; po ; [UL] ; (co | po) ; [LKW] ;
		fencerel(After-unlock-lock) ; [M])

Maybe something like this?

	([M] ; fencerel(Before-atomic) ; [RMW] ; fencerel(After-atomic) ; [M]) |
	([M] ; fencerel(Before-atomic) ; [RMW] |
	( [RMW] ; fencerel(After-atomic) ; [M]) |
	([M] ; po? ; [LKW] ; fencerel(After-spinlock) ; [M]) |
	([M] ; po ; [UL] ; (co | po) ; [LKW] ;
		fencerel(After-unlock-lock) ; [M])

Who is the lead maintainer for this stuff, anyway???  ;-)

							Thanx, Paul

> Alan
> 
> > The mips implementation seems also affected by such "reorderings": I am
> > not familiar with this implementation but, AFAICT, it does not enforce
> > ordering from A to B in the following snippet:
> > 
> > 	A:*x = 1;
> > 	atomic_inc(u);
> > 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
> > 	B:WRITE_ONCE(*y, 1);
> > 
> > when CONFIG_WEAK_ORDERING=y, CONFIG_WEAK_REORDERING_BEYOND_LLSC=n.
> > 
> > Do these observations make sense to you?  Thoughts?
> > 
> >   Andrea
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-18 18:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-19 19:38 Adding plain accesses and detecting data races in the LKMM Alan Stern
2019-04-02 14:42 ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-02 18:06   ` Alan Stern
2019-04-06  0:49     ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-06 16:03       ` Alan Stern
2019-04-08  5:51         ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-08 14:18           ` Alan Stern
2019-04-09  1:36             ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-09 15:01               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-13 21:39                 ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-15 13:35                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-15 13:50                     ` Alan Stern
2019-04-15 13:53                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-18 12:54                     ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-18 17:44                       ` Alan Stern
2019-04-18 18:39                         ` Paul E. McKenney [this message]
2019-04-18 20:19                           ` Alan Stern
2019-04-19  0:53                         ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-19 12:47                           ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-19 14:34                             ` Alan Stern
2019-04-19 17:17                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-19 15:06                             ` Akira Yokosawa
2019-04-19 16:37                               ` Andrea Parri
2019-04-19 18:06                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-04-20 14:50                                 ` Akira Yokosawa
2019-04-21 19:38                                   ` Paul E. McKenney

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