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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gary Hook <Gary.Hook@amd.com>, Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>,
	Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org>, Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 14/16] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup
Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 07:41:05 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190516114107.8963-14-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190516114107.8963-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Gary Hook <Gary.Hook@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f ]

Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very
early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves
scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'.

To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library
functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early
enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem
is initialized.

For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN
is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot
failure.

When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation
of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c.

 [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ]

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Reported-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org>
Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 12 ++++++++++++
 lib/Makefile          | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index d435c89875c14..60b410ff31e8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@
 # Produces uninteresting flaky coverage.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_delay.o	:= n
 
+# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o  := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_cmdline.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
 inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
 inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
 quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN     $@
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index b1ac450329033..4ea31c2d982df 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
 
+# Early boot use of cmdline, don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_string.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
 lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o timerqueue.o\
 	 idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-16 11:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-16 11:40 [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 01/16] xfrm: policy: Fix out-of-bound array accesses in __xfrm_policy_unlink Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 02/16] xfrm6_tunnel: Fix potential panic when unloading xfrm6_tunnel module Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 03/16] vti4: ipip tunnel deregistration fixes Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 04/16] esp4: add length check for UDP encapsulation Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 05/16] xfrm4: Fix uninitialized memory read in _decode_session4 Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 06/16] power: supply: cpcap-battery: Fix division by zero Sasha Levin
2019-05-19 21:31   ` Pavel Machek
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 07/16] securityfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:40 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 08/16] apparmorfs: " Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 09/16] mac80211: Fix kernel panic due to use of txq after free Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 10/16] KVM: arm/arm64: Ensure vcpu target is unset on reset failure Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41   ` Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 11/16] power: supply: sysfs: prevent endless uevent loop with CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY_DEBUG Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 12/16] iwlwifi: mvm: check for length correctness in iwl_mvm_create_skb() Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 13/16] sched/cpufreq: Fix kobject memleak Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 15/16] ufs: fix braino in ufs_get_inode_gid() for solaris UFS flavour Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 16/16] perf bench numa: Add define for RUSAGE_THREAD if not present Sasha Levin
2019-05-16 11:41   ` Sasha Levin

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