All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>,
	jeffhost@microsoft.com, l.s.r@web.de, gitster@pobox.com,
	spearce@spearce.org, jrn@google.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NULL in URLs
Date: Mon,  3 Jun 2019 13:45:26 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190603204526.7723-3-matvore@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190603204526.7723-1-matvore@google.com>

There is no reason to allow %00 to terminate a string, so do not allow it.
Otherwise, we end up returning arbitrary content in the string (that which is
after the %00) which is effectively hidden from callers and can escape sanity
checks and validation, and possible be used in tandem with a security
vulnerability to introduce a payload.

Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
---
 url.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
index c0bb4e23c3..cf791cb139 100644
--- a/url.c
+++ b/url.c
@@ -41,21 +41,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
 		if (!c)
 			break;
 		if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
 			q++;
 			len--;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		if (c == '%' && len >= 3) {
 			int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
-			if (0 <= val) {
+			if (0 < val) {
 				strbuf_addch(out, val);
 				q += 3;
 				len -= 3;
 				continue;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (decode_plus && c == '+')
 			strbuf_addch(out, ' ');
 		else
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-03 21:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-03 20:45 [PATCH 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2019-06-03 20:45 ` [PATCH 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04  5:00   ` René Scharfe
2019-06-04 17:22     ` Matthew DeVore
2019-06-03 20:45 ` Matthew DeVore [this message]
2019-06-04  1:02   ` [PATCH 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NULL in URLs brian m. carlson
2019-06-04 17:38     ` Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04  5:01   ` René Scharfe
2019-06-04 17:23     ` Matthew DeVore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190603204526.7723-3-matvore@google.com \
    --to=matvore@google.com \
    --cc=git@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=gitster@pobox.com \
    --cc=jeffhost@microsoft.com \
    --cc=jrn@google.com \
    --cc=l.s.r@web.de \
    --cc=spearce@spearce.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.