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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 22:26:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906172225.4645462F1E@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190617221932.7406c74b6a8114a406984b70@linux-foundation.org>

On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 10:19:32PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Mon, 17 Jun 2019 22:07:41 -0700 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome
> > OS. And it gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros
> > too via the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested
> > by folks where memory forensics is included in their thread models.)
> 
> Thanks.  I added the above to the changelog.  I assumed s/thread/threat/

Heh whoops, yes, "threat" was intended. Thanks! :)

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-18  5:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-17 15:10 [PATCH v7 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-17 15:10 ` [PATCH v7 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 " Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-17 22:10   ` Andrew Morton
2019-06-18  5:07     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-18  5:19       ` Andrew Morton
2019-06-18  5:26         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-21  7:09   ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-21  8:57     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-21  9:11       ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-21  9:18         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-21 14:10       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-21 15:12         ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-21 15:24           ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-21 15:54             ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-21 12:36   ` Qian Cai
2019-06-21 13:31     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-21 13:36       ` Qian Cai
2019-06-17 15:10 ` [PATCH v7 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time Alexander Potapenko

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