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From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 08:20:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190619152018.GC1203@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dc3d59c2783ea81d85d4d447bd1a4a2d5fe51421.camel@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 05:43:11PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, 2019-06-17 at 15:24 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > +	__u32	flags;
> 
> This should be changed to secinfo_flags_mask containing a mask of the
> allowed bits for the secinfo flags because of two obvious reasons:
> 
> 1. Protection flags are used mainly with syscalls and contain also other
>    things than just the permissions that do not apply in this context.
> 2. Having a mask for all secinfo flags is more future proof.
> 
> With the protection flags you end up reserving bits forever for things
> that we will never have any use for (e.g. PROT_SEM).
> 
> Looking the change you convert 'flags' (wondering why it isn't called
> 'prot') to VM flags, which means that you essentially gain absolutely
> nothing and loose some potential versatility as a side-effect by doing
> that.

Ah, I see where you're coming from.  My intent was that supported flags
would be SGX specific, not generic PROT_* flags.  I.e. bits 2:0 are used
for PROT_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}, bit 7 can be used for SGX_ZERO_PAGE, etc...

I have two objections to 'secinfo_flags_mask':

  - A full SECINFO mask is problematic for literally every other bit/field
    currently defined in SECINFO.FLAGS, e.g. masking PAGE_TYPE, PENDING
    and MODIFIED adds no value that I can think of, but would require the
    kernel do to weird things like reject page types and EMODPR requests
    (due to their PENDING/MODIFIED interaction).

  - The kernel doesn't actually restrict SECINFO based on the param, it's
    restricting VM_MAY* flags in the vmas.  'secinfo_flags_mask' implies
    the kernel is somehow masking SECINFO.

What about something like this?

/**
 * struct sgx_enclave_add_page - parameter structure for the
 *                               %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl
 * @addr:	address within the ELRANGE
 * @src:	address for the page data
 * @secinfo:	address for the SECINFO data
 * @mrmask:	bitmask for the measured 256 byte chunks
 * @prot:	maximal PROT_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} permissions for the page
 */
struct sgx_enclave_add_page {
	__u64		addr;
	__u64		src;
	__u64		secinfo;
	__u16		mrmask;
	__u8		prot;
	__u8		pad;
	__u64[2]	reserved;
};

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-19 15:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-17 22:24 [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 23:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-18 14:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 16:06       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 12:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 13:00     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 20:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 13:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 14:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 22:07       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 15:20     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-06-20 22:17       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 15:23           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 16:19             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:06               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 17:25                 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-15 22:29                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-01 16:38                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-04 22:20                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 20:51                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-08-05 21:30                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07 18:51                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:46   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 14:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 21:13     ` James Morris
2019-06-20  9:28       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-20 22:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-23 17:16       ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-26 20:39         ` James Morris
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 14:49   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 20:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-17 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 13:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3 Stephen Smalley
2019-06-18 13:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-18 15:13     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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