From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 16:12:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906221611.88844FB@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190621185233.6766-22-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 11:52:30AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
> a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
> to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
> removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
> revision of LSM interfaces.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.h | 6 +++---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 38 +++++++++++---------------------------
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> dev_t rdev;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob olsm;
> struct audit_cap_data fcap;
> unsigned int fcap_ver;
> unsigned char type; /* record type */
> @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> kuid_t target_auid;
> kuid_t target_uid;
> unsigned int target_sessionid;
> - struct lsmblob target_lsm;
> + struct lsmblob target_lsm;
> char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
>
> struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> umode_t mode;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob olsm;
> int has_perm;
> uid_t perm_uid;
> gid_t perm_gid;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 0478680cd0a8..d3ad13f11788 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob,
> + &name->olsm,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> f->lsm_rule);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob,
> + &n->olsm,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
> f->type, f->op,
> f->lsm_rule))
> ++result;
> @@ -1187,21 +1184,18 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> context->socketcall.args[i]);
> break; }
> case AUDIT_IPC: {
> - u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
> + struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> - if (osid) {
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
> struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> - struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
Should this (and the other) audit_log_format() calls actually be
removed?
-Kees
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt))
> *call_panic = 1;
> - } else {
> + else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> }
> @@ -1346,13 +1340,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (n->osid != 0) {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> } else {
> @@ -1906,17 +1897,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
> void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> - name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
> @@ -2266,14 +2253,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
> void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> {
> struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
> context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
> context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
> context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> - context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
> + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
> context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
> }
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-22 23:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-21 18:52 [PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:31 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 16:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 17:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:50 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:48 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:47 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:12 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-24 21:33 ` John Johansen
2019-06-25 1:01 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-25 1:46 ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 1:46 ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 2:14 ` John Johansen
2019-06-25 2:14 ` John Johansen
2019-06-25 2:42 ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 2:42 ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 15:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-25 15:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:13 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:39 ` John Johansen
2019-06-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:47 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:44 ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:45 ` John Johansen
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