From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 16:37:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906221637.6BEE8F7@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190622000358.19895-3-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 05:03:31PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
> kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
> runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> security/security.c | 6 ++++++
> 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 66fd1eac7a32..df2aebc99838 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1790,6 +1790,7 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> + int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
> };
>
> struct security_hook_heads {
> @@ -2027,6 +2028,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
> struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> + struct hlist_head locked_down;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1bb6fb2f1523..9eaf02e70707 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ enum lsm_event {
> LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
> };
>
> +enum lockdown_reason {
> + LOCKDOWN_NONE,
> + LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
> + LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
> +};
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -389,6 +395,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> @@ -1189,6 +1196,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> +static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 487e1f3eb2df..553f50e9a106 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2382,3 +2382,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +
> +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
> --
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-22 23:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-22 0:03 [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 17:52 ` Pavel Machek
2019-06-24 13:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-07-10 15:26 ` Joey Lee
2019-07-11 4:11 ` joeyli
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:01 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 1:49 ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-27 15:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 11:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 1:57 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 15:15 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 19:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-24 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:59 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-25 15:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23 0:25 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 23:01 ` [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM James Morris
2019-06-24 23:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 23:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-25 6:04 ` James Morris
2019-06-25 8:16 ` John Johansen
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