From: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
To: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, kernel-team@fb.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 0/4] sys_bpf() access control via /dev/bpf
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 13:51:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190625205155.GD10487@mini-arch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190625182303.874270-1-songliubraving@fb.com>
On 06/25, Song Liu wrote:
> Currently, most access to sys_bpf() is limited to root. However, there are
> use cases that would benefit from non-privileged use of sys_bpf(), e.g.
> systemd.
>
> This set introduces a new model to control the access to sys_bpf(). A
> special device, /dev/bpf, is introduced to manage access to sys_bpf().
> Users with access to open /dev/bpf will be able to access most of
> sys_bpf() features. The use can get access to sys_bpf() by opening /dev/bpf
> and use ioctl to get/put permission.
>
> The permission to access sys_bpf() is marked by bit TASK_BPF_FLAG_PERMITTED
> in task_struct. During fork(), child will not inherit this bit.
2c: if we are going to have an fd, I'd vote for a proper fd based access
checks instead of a per-task flag, so we can do:
ioctl(fd, BPF_MAP_CREATE, uattr, sizeof(uattr))
(and pass this fd around)
I do understand that it breaks current assumptions that libbpf has,
but maybe we can extend _xattr variants to accept optinal fd (and try
to fallback to sysctl if it's absent/not working)?
> libbpf APIs libbpf_[get|put]_bpf_permission() are added to help get and
> put the permission. bpftool is updated to use these APIs.
>
> Song Liu (4):
> bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
> bpf: sync tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> libbpf: add libbpf_[get|put]_bpf_permission()
> bpftool: use libbpf_[get|put]_bpf_permission()
>
> Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 +
> include/linux/bpf.h | 12 +++++
> include/linux/sched.h | 8 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 5 ++
> kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 +-
> kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 4 +-
> kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/offload.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
> kernel/bpf/xskmap.c | 2 +-
> kernel/fork.c | 4 ++
> net/core/filter.c | 6 +--
> tools/bpf/bpftool/feature.c | 2 +-
> tools/bpf/bpftool/main.c | 5 ++
> tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 5 ++
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h | 7 +++
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map | 2 +
> 26 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-25 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-25 18:22 [PATCH bpf-next 0/4] sys_bpf() access control via /dev/bpf Song Liu
2019-06-25 18:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access " Song Liu
2019-06-26 13:32 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-26 15:17 ` Song Liu
2019-06-27 0:08 ` Greg KH
2019-06-27 1:00 ` Song Liu
2019-06-27 16:37 ` Greg KH
2019-06-27 16:51 ` Song Liu
2019-06-27 17:00 ` Greg KH
2019-06-26 13:45 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-06-26 15:19 ` Song Liu
2019-06-26 15:26 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-06-26 16:10 ` Song Liu
2019-06-25 18:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: sync tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h Song Liu
2019-06-25 18:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/4] libbpf: add libbpf_[get|put]_bpf_permission() Song Liu
2019-06-25 18:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/4] bpftool: use libbpf_[get|put]_bpf_permission() Song Liu
2019-06-25 20:51 ` Stanislav Fomichev [this message]
2019-06-25 21:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/4] sys_bpf() access control via /dev/bpf Alexei Starovoitov
2019-06-25 21:19 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2019-06-25 22:47 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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