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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 09:29:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906270926.02AAEE93@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1561641911.5154.85.camel@lca.pw>

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 09:25:11AM -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-06-27 at 15:03 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > +static int __init early_init_on_alloc(char *buf)
> > +{
> > +	int ret;
> > +	bool bool_result;
> > +
> > +	if (!buf)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result);
> > +	if (bool_result && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING))
> > +		pr_warn("mem auto-init: CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is on, will
> > take precedence over init_on_alloc\n");
> 
> I don't like the warning here. It makes people think it is bug that need to be
> fixed, but actually it is just information. People could enable both in a debug
> kernel.

How would you suggest it be adjusted? Should it be silent, or be
switched to pr_info()?

Also, doesn't this need to check "want_page_poisoning", not just
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING? Perhaps just leave the warning out entirely?

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-27 16:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-27 13:03 [PATCH v9 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-27 13:03 ` [PATCH v9 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 " Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-27 13:25   ` Qian Cai
2019-06-27 16:29     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-27 16:44       ` Qian Cai
2019-06-27 13:57   ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-27 19:59   ` James Morris
2019-06-27 13:03 ` [PATCH v9 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time Alexander Potapenko

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