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From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: doc: mds: nitpicking and typo fix
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 12:01:07 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190724100107.GA7206@amd> (raw)

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Consistently end sentences, fix typo.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>

commit 310cb17613f46db97cebbd9dc11187961e4b1c69
Author: Pavel <pavel@ucw.cz>
Date:   Mon May 20 10:46:35 2019 +0200

    doc: typo fix, consistency in mds.

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
index 5d4330b..9983b50 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@ needed for exploiting MDS requires:
  - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
 
  - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
-   data for consumption through a side channel.
+   data for consumption through a side channel
 
  - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
    data
 
 The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
-100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremely unlikely.
 
 There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
 untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated


-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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                 reply	other threads:[~2019-07-24 10:01 UTC|newest]

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