From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61E8AC3A5A2 for ; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:00:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 357E720870 for ; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:00:23 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 357E720870 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:57510 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1i1B38-0003pq-1R for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 11:00:22 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:55095) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1i1Azb-0000Fu-LW for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 10:56:45 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1i1Aza-0001RN-0i for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 10:56:43 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:34516) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1i1AzZ-0001RA-Od for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 10:56:41 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33C54881362; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from work-vm (ovpn-117-244.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.117.244]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 216F02632E; Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:56:36 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:56:34 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" To: Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= Message-ID: <20190823145634.GK2784@work-vm> References: <20190808150325.21939-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> <20190823112053.GE9654@redhat.com> <20190823114157.GG9654@redhat.com> <20190823130014.GG2784@work-vm> <20190823140948.GI2784@work-vm> <20190823142054.GK9654@redhat.com> <20190823142602.GJ2784@work-vm> <20190823144052.GL9654@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190823144052.GL9654@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.2 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.69]); Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Received-From: 209.132.183.28 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 0/2] Add dbus-vmstate X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Laurent Vivier , Thomas Huth , Juan Quintela , qemu-devel , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Marc-Andr=E9?= Lureau , Stefan Hajnoczi , Paolo Bonzini Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" * Daniel P. Berrang=E9 (berrange@redhat.com) wrote: > On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 03:26:02PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > * Daniel P. Berrang=E9 (berrange@redhat.com) wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 03:09:48PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wr= ote: > > > > * Marc-Andr=E9 Lureau (marcandre.lureau@gmail.com) wrote: > > > > > Hi > > > > >=20 > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 5:00 PM Dr. David Alan Gilbert > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > * Daniel P. Berrang=E9 (berrange@redhat.com) wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This means QEMU still has to iterate over every single clie= nt > > > > > > > on the bus to identify them. If you're doing that, there's > > > > > > > no point in owning a well known service at all. Just iterat= e > > > > > > > over the unique bus names and look for the exported object > > > > > > > path /org/qemu/VMState > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not knowing anything about DBus security, I want to ask how d= o > > > > > > we handle security here? > > > > >=20 > > > > > First of all, we are talking about cooperative processes, and h= aving a > > > > > specific bus for each qemu instance. So some amount of security= /trust > > > > > is already assumed. > > > >=20 > > > > Some but we need to keep it as limited as possible; for example t= wo > > > > reasons for having separate processes both come down to security: > > > >=20 > > > > a) vtpm - however screwy the qemu is, you can never get to the = keys in > > > > the vtpm > > >=20 > > > Processes connected to dbus can only call the DBus APIs that vtpm > > > actually exports. The vtpm should simply *not* export a DBus > > > API that allows anything to fetch the keys. > > >=20 > > > If it did want to export APIs for fetching keys, then we would > > > have to ensure suitable dbus /selinux policy was created to > > > prevent unwarranted access. > >=20 > > This was really just one example of where the security/trust isn't > > assumed; however a more concrete case is migration of a vtpm, and eve= n > > though it's probably encrypted blob you still don't want some other > > device to grab the migration data - or to say reinitialise the vtpm. >=20 > That can be dealt with by the dbus security policies, provided > you either run the vtpm as a different user ID from the other > untrustworthy helpers, or use a different selinux context for > vtpm. You can then express that only the user that QEMU is > running under can talk to vtpm over dbus. The need for the extra user ID or selinux context is a pain; but probably warranted for the vTPM; in general though some of this exists because of the choice of DBus and wouldn't be a problem for something that had a point-to-point socket it sent everything over. > Where I think you could have problems is if you needed finer > grainer control with selinux. eg if vstpm exports 2 different > services, you can't allow access to one service, but forbid > access to the other service. >=20 > > > > b) virtio-gpu, loads of complex GPU code that can't break the m= ain > > > > qemu process. > > >=20 > > > That's no problem - virtio-gpu crashes, it disappears from the dbus > > > bus, but everything else keeps running. > >=20 > > Crashing is the easy case; assume it's malicious and you don't want i= t > > getting to say a storage device provided by another vhost-user device= . >=20 > If we assume that the 2 processes can't commnuicate / access each > other outside DBus, then the attack avenues added by use of dbus > are most likely either: >=20 > - invoking some DBus method that should not be allowed due > to incomplete dbus security policy.=20 >=20 > - finding a crash in a dbus client library that you can somehow > exploit to get remote code execution in the separate process >=20 > I won't claim this is impossible, but I think it helps to be > using a standard, widely used battle tested RPC impl, rather > than a home grown RPC protocol. It's only the policy case I worry about; and my point here is if we decide to use dbus then we have to think properly about security and defined stuff. >=20 >=20 > > > > > But if necessary, dbus can enforce policies on who is allowed t= o own a > > > > > name, or to send/receive message from. As far as I know, this i= s > > > > > mostly user/group policies. > > > > >=20 > > > > > But there is also SELinux checks to send_msg and acquire_svc (s= ee > > > > > dbus-daemon(1)) > > > >=20 > > > > But how does something like SELinux interact with a private dbus=20 > > > > rather than the system dbus? > > >=20 > > > There's already two dbus-daemon's on each host - the system one and > > > the session one, and they get different selinux contexts, > > > system_dbus_t and unconfined_dbus_t. > > >=20 > > > Since libvirt would be responsible for launching these private dbus > > > daemons it would be easy to make it run svirt_dbus_t for example. > > > Actually it would be svirt_dbus_t:s0:cNNN,cMMM to get uniqueness > > > per VM. > > >=20 > > > Will of course require us to talk to the SELinux maintainers to > > > get some sensible policy rules created. > >=20 > > This all relies on SELinux and running privileged qemu/vhost-user pai= rs; > > needing to do that purely to enforce security seems wrong. >=20 > Compare to an alternative bus-less solution where each helper has > a direct UNIX socket connection to QEMU. >=20 > If two helpers are running as the same user ID, then can still > directly attack each other via things like ptrace or /proc/$PID/mem, > unless you've used SELinux to isolate them, or run each as a distinct > user ID. If you do the latter, then we can still easily isolate > them using dbus. You can lock those down pretty easily though. Dave >=20 > Regards, > Daniel > --=20 > |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberr= ange :| > |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange= .com :| > |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberr= ange :| -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK