From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 11:42:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190909094230.GB27626@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1567126741.git.luto@kernel.org>
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On Thu 2019-08-29 18:11:35, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> This makes two major semantic changes to Linux's random APIs:
>
> It adds getentropy(..., GRND_INSECURE). This causes getentropy to
> always return *something*. There is no guarantee whatsoever that
> the result will be cryptographically random or even unique, but the
> kernel will give the best quality random output it can. The name is
> a big hint: the resulting output is INSECURE.
>
> The purpose of this is to allow programs that genuinely want
> best-effort entropy to get it without resorting to /dev/urandom.
> Plenty of programs do this because they need to do *something*
> during boot and they can't afford to wait. Calling it "INSECURE" is
> probably the best we can do to discourage using this API for things
> that need security.
>
> This series also removes the blocking pool and makes /dev/random
> work just like getentropy(..., 0) and makes GRND_RANDOM a no-op. I
> believe that Linux's blocking pool has outlived its usefulness.
> Linux's CRNG generates output that is good enough to use even for
> key generation. The blocking pool is not stronger in any material
> way, and keeping it around requires a lot of infrastructure of
> dubious value.
Could you give some more justification? If crng is good enough for
you, you can use /dev/urandom...
are
> This series should not break any existing programs. /dev/urandom is
> unchanged. /dev/random will still block just after booting, but it
> will block less than it used to. getentropy() with existing flags
> will return output that is, for practical purposes, just as strong
> as before.
So what is the exact semantic of /dev/random after your change?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-09 9:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-30 1:11 [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 1/7] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 2/7] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 3/7] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 4/7] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 5/7] random: Remove the blocking pool Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 6/7] random: Delete code to pull data into pools Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:11 ` [PATCH 7/7] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-30 1:49 ` [PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-30 2:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-09 9:42 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2019-09-09 22:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
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