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From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Thomas <trenn@suse.de>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: /dev/mem and secure boot
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 15:09:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190909150957.12abe684@endymion> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190906121510.GA17328@kroah.com>

Hi Greg,

On Fri, 6 Sep 2019 14:15:10 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 06, 2019 at 01:02:21PM +0200, Jean Delvare wrote:
> > I've been bitten recently by mcelog not working on machines started in
> > secure boot mode. mcelog tries to read DMI information from /dev/mem
> > and fails to open it.  
> 
> What do you mean by "secure boot"?  Is this matthew's patchset that
> restricts /dev/mem/ or something else?

I mean that early in the kernel log is:

Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down

Digging it up, I found that this comes from a patch in our SLES kernel,
that's not upstream (yet). It is from a patch set by David Howells
(Cc'd) posted in April 2017:

https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9665591/
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9665015/

I wrongly assumed it had been merged upstream meanwhile but I was
wrong. David, any reason why this didn't happen? Out of curiosity, are
these patches in RHEL kernels?

> > This made me wonder: if not even root can read /dev/mem (nor, I
> > suppose, /dev/kmem and /dev/port) in secure boot mode, why are we
> > creating these device nodes at all in the first place? Can't we detect
> > that we are in secure boot mode and skip that step, and reap the rewards
> > (faster boot, lower memory footprint and less confusion)?  
> 
> Sure, feel free to not register it at all if the mode is enabled.

Now I feel sorry that I asked my question upstream when there's nothing
to be done there. I'll go bother SUSE kernel folks instead, sorry for
the noise. And thanks for the advice.

-- 
Jean Delvare
SUSE L3 Support

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-09-09 13:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-06 11:02 /dev/mem and secure boot Jean Delvare
2019-09-06 12:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-09-06 15:07   ` Jean Delvare
2019-09-06 15:08     ` Jean Delvare
2019-09-09 13:09   ` Jean Delvare [this message]
2019-09-12 10:44     ` Thomas Renninger
2019-09-16  9:38     ` David Howells

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