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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 18:34:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191007173432.GM26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whraNSys_Lj=Ut1EA=CJEfw2Uothh+5-WL+7nDJBegWcQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Oct 06, 2019 at 08:11:42PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:

> > So do we want to bother with separation between raw_copy_to_user() and
> > unsafe_copy_to_user()?  After all, __copy_to_user() also has only few
> > callers, most of them in arch/*
> 
> No, you're right. Just switch over.
> 
> > I'll take a look into that tomorrow - half-asleep right now...
> 
> Thanks. No huge hurry.

Tangentially related: copy_regster_to_user() and copy_regset_from_user().
That's where we do access_ok(), followed by calls of ->get() and
->set() resp.  Those tend to either use user_regset_copy{out,in}(),
or open-code those.  The former variant tends to lead to few calls
of __copy_{to,from}_user(); the latter...  On x86 it ends up doing
this:
static int genregs_get(struct task_struct *target,
                       const struct user_regset *regset,
                       unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
                       void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
        if (kbuf) {
                unsigned long *k = kbuf;
                while (count >= sizeof(*k)) {
                        *k++ = getreg(target, pos);
                        count -= sizeof(*k);
                        pos += sizeof(*k);
                }
        } else {
                unsigned long __user *u = ubuf;
                while (count >= sizeof(*u)) {
                        if (__put_user(getreg(target, pos), u++))
                                return -EFAULT;
                        count -= sizeof(*u);
                        pos += sizeof(*u);
                }
        }

        return 0;
}

Potentially doing arseloads of stac/clac as it goes.  OTOH, getreg()
(and setreg()) in there are not entirely trivial, so blanket
user_access_begin()/user_access_end() over the entire loop might be
a bad idea...

How hot is that codepath?  I know that arch/um used to rely on it
(== PTRACE_[GS]ETREGS) quite a bit...

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-07 17:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-06 22:20 [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Guenter Roeck
2019-10-06 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-06 23:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:04     ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  1:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  1:24         ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:06           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  2:50             ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  3:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 15:40                 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 18:11                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  9:58                     ` David Laight
2019-10-07 17:34                 ` Al Viro [this message]
2019-10-07 18:13                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:22                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:26                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:36                   ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 19:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 19:49                       ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 20:04                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  3:29                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:09                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  4:14                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  5:02                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:24                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-10 19:55                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-10 22:12                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-11  0:11                             ` Al Viro
2019-10-11  0:31                               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 18:13                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 18:43                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:10                                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 19:22                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:59                                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 20:20                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15  3:46                                             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 18:08                                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 19:00                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 19:40                                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 20:18                                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:12                                             ` [RFC] change of calling conventions for arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:24                                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-16 20:25                                         ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:36                                           ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                             ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] sg_ioctl(): fix copyout handling Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] sg_new_write(): replace access_ok() + __copy_from_user() with copy_from_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] sg_write(): __get_user() can fail Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] sg_read(): simplify reading ->pack_id of userland sg_io_hdr_t Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] sg_new_write(): don't bother with access_ok Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] sg_read(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_..._user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] sg_write(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_from_user()/__get_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] SG_IO: get rid of access_ok() Al Viro
2019-10-17 21:44                                             ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Douglas Gilbert
2019-11-05  4:54                                             ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-11-05  5:25                                               ` Al Viro
2019-11-06  4:29                                                 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-10-18  0:27                                           ` [RFC] csum_and_copy_from_user() semantics Al Viro
2019-10-25 14:01                                       ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-08  4:57                       ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 13:14                         ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 15:29                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 15:38                             ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 17:06                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 19:58                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:16                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:34                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:30         ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  3:12           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:23   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  4:04 ` Max Filippov
2019-10-07 12:16   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 20:29   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 23:27   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-08  6:28     ` Geert Uytterhoeven

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