From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42462 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730955AbfJIXpX (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Oct 2019 19:45:23 -0400 From: Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH] fscrypt: zeroize fscrypt_info before freeing Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 16:44:42 -0700 Message-Id: <20191009234442.225847-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Jaegeuk Kim List-ID: From: Eric Biggers memset the struct fscrypt_info to zero before freeing. This isn't really needed currently, since there's no secret key directly in the fscrypt_info. But there's a decent chance that someone will add such a field in the future, e.g. in order to use an API that takes a raw key such as siphash(). So it's good to do this as a hardening measure. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index df3e1c8653884..0ba33e010312f 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) key_invalidate(key); key_put(key); } + memzero_explicit(ci, sizeof(*ci)); kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); } -- 2.23.0.581.g78d2f28ef7-goog