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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	David Safford <david.safford@ge.com>,
	Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm: Salt tpm_get_random() result with get_random_bytes()
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 13:41:10 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191016104110.GB10184@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE=NcraH_6nDe4Ax9axsbsrMf+EggCQFibY3dpNNgGm7NYTtJQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 10:02:01AM +0300, Janne Karhunen wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 15, 2019 at 3:50 PM Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > Salt the result that comes from the TPM RNG with random bytes from the
> > kernel RNG. This will allow to use tpm_get_random() as a substitute for
> > get_random_bytes().  TPM could have a bug (making results predicatable),
> > backdoor or even an inteposer in the bus. Salting gives protections
> > against these concerns.
> 
> The current issue in the randomness from my point of view is that
> encrypted filesystems, ima etc in common deployments require high
> quality entropy just few seconds after the system has powered on for
> the first time. It is likely that people want to keep their keys
> device specific, so the keys need to be generated on the first boot
> before any of the filesystems mount.

This patch does not have the described issue.

Which call sites are you talking about?

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-16 10:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-15 12:47 [PATCH] tpm: Salt tpm_get_random() result with get_random_bytes() Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-10-15 17:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-10-16 10:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-10-16 10:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-10-16 16:09       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-10-17 16:21         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-10-16  7:02 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-10-16 10:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-10-16 11:16     ` Janne Karhunen
2019-10-16 16:23       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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