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From: coverity-bot <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	linux-next@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Coverity: add_ipu_page(): Memory - illegal accesses
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 17:34:44 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201911111734.21CB897FD@keescook> (raw)

Hello!

This is an experimental automated report about issues detected by Coverity
from a scan of next-20191108 as part of the linux-next weekly scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan

You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified
lines of code (noted below) that were touched by recent commits:

0b20fcec8651 ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio")

Coverity reported the following:

*** CID 1487851:  Memory - illegal accesses  (USE_AFTER_FREE)
/fs/f2fs/data.c: 604 in add_ipu_page()
598     			break;
599     		}
600     		up_write(&io->bio_list_lock);
601     	}
602
603     	if (ret) {
vvv     CID 1487851:  Memory - illegal accesses  (USE_AFTER_FREE)
vvv     Calling "bio_put" dereferences freed pointer "*bio".
604     		bio_put(*bio);
605     		*bio = NULL;
606     	}
607
608     	return ret;
609     }

If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):

Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1487851 ("Memory - illegal accesses")
Fixes: 0b20fcec8651 ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio")


Thanks for your attention!

-- 
Coverity-bot

             reply	other threads:[~2019-11-12  1:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-12  1:34 coverity-bot [this message]
2019-11-12  2:48 ` Coverity: add_ipu_page(): Memory - illegal accesses Chao Yu
2019-11-12 22:47   ` Kees Cook

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