From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: pomonis@google.com, ahonig@google.com, jmattson@google.com,
nifi@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 13:51:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200209185108.GR3584@sasha-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <158124937222923@kroah.com>
On Sun, Feb 09, 2020 at 12:56:12PM +0100, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
>The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
>If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
>tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
>id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
>
>thanks,
>
>greg k-h
>
>------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>
>From 66061740f1a487f4ed54fde75e724709f805da53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
>Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:53 -0800
>Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
>
>This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
>and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
>kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
>reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
>exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
>perspective.
>
>Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
>
>Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
>Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
>Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
>Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Conflict due to missing 0e6f467ee28e ("KVM: x86/pmu: mask the result of
rdpmc according to the width of the counters"). I've fixed it and queued
for 4.14-4.4.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-09 18:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-09 11:56 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree gregkh
2020-02-09 18:51 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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