Re: [PATCH 35/35] DOCUMENTATION: Protected virtual machine introduction and IPL

[Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>]

On Tue, 11 Feb 2020 21:03:17 +0100
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:

> On 11.02.20 13:23, Thomas Huth wrote:
> > On 07/02/2020 12.39, Christian Borntraeger wrote:  
> >> +The switch into PV mode lets us load encrypted guest executables and  
> > 
> > Maybe rather: "After the switch into PV mode, the guest can load ..." ?  
> 
> No its not after the switch. By doing the switch the guest image can be loaded
> fro anywhere because it is just like a kernel.
> 
> So I will do:
> 
> As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the
> switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest
> executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi,
> direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process.

Sounds good to me.

(...)

> >> +All non-decrypted data of the guest before it switches to protected
> >> +virtualization mode are zero on first access of the PV.  
> > 
> > Before it switches to protected virtualization mode, all non-decrypted
> > data of the guest are ... ?  
> 
> No, this is about the data after the initial import.
> What about
> 
> After the initial import of the encrypted data all defined pages will

s/data/data,/

> contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as
> zero pages on first access.

Also sounds good to me.

(...)