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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "Alexei Starovoitov" <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
	"kernel list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@google.com>,
	"Florent Revest" <revest@google.com>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	"Paul Turner" <pjt@google.com>,
	"Brendan Gregg" <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian@brauner.io>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>,
	"Brendan Jackman" <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Kernel Team" <kernel-team@fb.com>
Subject: Re: BPF LSM and fexit [was: [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/10] bpf: lsm: Add mutable hooks list for the BPF LSM]
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 17:04:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200212160427.GA259057@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ff6dec98-5e33-4603-1b90-e4bff23695cc@iogearbox.net>

On 12-Feb 14:27, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 2/12/20 3:45 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 01:09:07AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> > > 
> > > Another approach could be to have a special nop inside call_int_hook()
> > > macro which would then get patched to avoid these situations. Somewhat
> > > similar like static keys where it could be defined anywhere in text but
> > > with updating of call_int_hook()'s RC for the verdict.
> > 
> > Sounds nice in theory. I couldn't quite picture how that would look
> > in the code, so I hacked:
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 565bc9b67276..ce4bc1e5e26c 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> >   #include <linux/string.h>
> >   #include <linux/msg.h>
> >   #include <net/flow.h>
> > +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> > 
> >   #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR      2
> > 
> > @@ -678,12 +679,26 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> >    *     This is a hook that returns a value.
> >    */
> > 
> > +#define LSM_HOOK_NAME(FUNC) \
> > +       DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_lsm_key_##FUNC);
> > +#include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> > +#undef LSM_HOOK_NAME
> > +__diag_push();
> > +__diag_ignore(GCC, 8, "-Wstrict-prototypes", "");
> > +#define LSM_HOOK_NAME(FUNC) \
> > +       int bpf_lsm_call_##FUNC() {return 0;}
> > +#include <linux/lsm_hook_names.h>
> > +#undef LSM_HOOK_NAME
> > +__diag_pop();
> > +
> >   #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...)                              \
> >          do {                                                    \
> >                  struct security_hook_list *P;                   \
> >                                                                  \
> >                  hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
> >                          P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);              \
> > +               if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_lsm_key_##FUNC)) \
> > +                      (void)bpf_lsm_call_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
> >          } while (0)
> > 
> >   #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({                       \
> > @@ -696,6 +711,8 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> >                          if (RC != 0)                            \
> >                                  break;                          \
> >                  }                                               \
> > +               if (RC == IRC && static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_lsm_key_##FUNC)) \
> > +                      RC = bpf_lsm_call_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
> 
> Nit: the `RC == IRC` test could be moved behind the static_branch_unlikely() so
> that it would be bypassed when not enabled.
> 
> >          } while (0);                                            \
> >          RC;                                                     \
> >   })
> > 
> > The assembly looks good from correctness and performance points.
> > union security_list_options can be split into lsm_hook_names.h too
> > to avoid __diag_ignore. Is that what you have in mind?
> > I don't see how one can improve call_int_hook() macro without
> > full refactoring of linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > imo static_key doesn't have to be there in the first set. We can add this
> > optimization later.
> 
> Yes, like the above diff looks good, and then we'd dynamically attach the program
> at bpf_lsm_call_##FUNC()'s fexit hook for a direct jump, so all the security_blah()
> internals could stay as-is which then might also address Jann's concerns wrt
> concrete annotation as well as potential locking changes inside security_blah().
> Agree that patching out via static key could be optional but since you were talking
> about avoiding indirect jumps..

I like this approach as well. Will give it a go and update the
patches. Thanks a lot for your inputs!

- KP

> 
> Thanks,
> Daniel

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-12 16:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-23 15:24 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/10] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI) KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/10] bpf: btf: Add btf_type_by_name_kind KP Singh
2020-01-23 20:06   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-24 14:12     ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/10] bpf: lsm: Add a skeleton and config options KP Singh
2020-02-10 23:52   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 12:45     ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/10] bpf: lsm: Introduce types for eBPF based LSM KP Singh
2020-02-10 23:58   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 12:44     ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/10] bpf: lsm: Add mutable hooks list for the BPF LSM KP Singh
2020-01-23 17:03   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-23 17:59     ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 19:09       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-23 22:24         ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 23:50           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-24  1:25             ` KP Singh
2020-01-24 21:55               ` James Morris
2020-02-11  3:12   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 12:43     ` KP Singh
2020-02-11 17:58       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 18:44         ` BPF LSM and fexit [was: [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/10] bpf: lsm: Add mutable hooks list for the BPF LSM] Jann Horn
2020-02-11 19:09           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 19:36             ` Jann Horn
2020-02-11 20:10               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 20:33                 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-11 21:32                   ` Jann Horn
2020-02-11 21:38                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-11 23:26                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-12  0:09                       ` Daniel Borkmann
2020-02-12  2:45                         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-02-12 13:27                           ` Daniel Borkmann
2020-02-12 16:04                             ` KP Singh [this message]
2020-02-12 15:52                           ` Casey Schaufler
2020-02-12 16:26                             ` KP Singh
2020-02-12 18:59                               ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/10] bpf: lsm: BTF API for LSM hooks KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/10] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/10] bpf: lsm: Make the allocated callback RO+X KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/10] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM KP Singh
2020-01-23 18:00   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2020-01-24 14:16     ` KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/10] bpf: lsm: Add selftests " KP Singh
2020-01-23 15:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/10] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation KP Singh

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