From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D18A5C2BA83 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:03:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A056320656 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:03:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581699835; bh=3TZXsTWy+GWOyXb49qV/Qbo9WyB4oDNA5l7odcnIJfE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=LlWeqNGMlJ4c38EiprEkO8GG1cAml3UloqKUeGGh1lCPWovIaDBjx9lgW+TLDeXOJ JPpM39PORajKVlsQOCOmb/VrI+wIC7puYV7m/vVcorfL9B7ZlHGc6Z/4Jh/vazSwEn HM7rBF3kzOaMhCXFLFnt5HCvq8KcDVHq31snc2hE= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2392642AbgBNRDy (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 12:03:54 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:46246 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2392508AbgBNQPr (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:15:47 -0500 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0695C246F4; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 16:15:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581696946; bh=3TZXsTWy+GWOyXb49qV/Qbo9WyB4oDNA5l7odcnIJfE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=z1z+M09/xWS2RGELAr1pkPybO1rBSzsL7H8il2Pjob9iuV+v/FAf4/ZARQ6ygE9AD 0bPj1YsQs5A8kHc0dUSHLUU4DN+wQK1Zr8GNbIVPpQXwhhQ6aEHpLoiC3JR5f8OxRv GRjOqDXV8OM5I4YeD2LTJ6NrQlRQ+zSEHFj1mxD0= From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Ingo Molnar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 188/252] x86/mm: Fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:10:43 -0500 Message-Id: <20200214161147.15842-188-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200214161147.15842-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20200214161147.15842-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Ard Biesheuvel [ Upstream commit 75fbef0a8b6b4bb19b9a91b5214f846c2dc5139e ] The following commit: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index e2d4b25c7aa44..101f3ad0d6ad1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -2126,19 +2126,13 @@ int kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, .pgd = pgd, .numpages = numpages, .mask_set = __pgprot(0), - .mask_clr = __pgprot(0), + .mask_clr = __pgprot(~page_flags & (_PAGE_NX|_PAGE_RW)), .flags = 0, }; if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)) goto out; - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_NX)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_NX); - - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW); - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC)) cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr); -- 2.20.1