From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9077C3B19F for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 16:21:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86B78246C3 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 16:21:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581697296; bh=pMNCXhCm4QmotpzdA3S8UoGF3R5REzG4ykqsUsLmkIg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=RC1A5Se3eAfAKqajIX6Td3HrcqiD0v1aDcop5NjXEwDqG0mtOtx0Bt2vx+/XmtRp8 p/dheWaUe8Gkrcz7z3FVMEA554irrqvQO04KDH2AENmQ1zo8mlsMMH80irl4peVaxl g1axZzM4n9f2XtjaSbGHfRxJQUK/s1piQHWmh1zs= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2393015AbgBNQVf (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:21:35 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:53804 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2405164AbgBNQUO (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:20:14 -0500 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CACD224737; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 16:20:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581697213; bh=pMNCXhCm4QmotpzdA3S8UoGF3R5REzG4ykqsUsLmkIg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=TmNpbc29KCaYn1Cw0kYt9TunypUSnSUcbZm2FRq9T5QBV9G4po7rbRHNKHOeIUINX fO/Ky0rkI4XEp8Be4gGE6puh7QoIy/8sBL9Wa35fxuHYTMSExumhhV0F9ZNqzq3fHT tKzY7hCwjkPyFsDnGB4llNpffsL01abB/NDgp2YY= From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Ingo Molnar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 138/186] x86/mm: Fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 11:16:27 -0500 Message-Id: <20200214161715.18113-138-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200214161715.18113-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20200214161715.18113-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Ard Biesheuvel [ Upstream commit 75fbef0a8b6b4bb19b9a91b5214f846c2dc5139e ] The following commit: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 835620ab435fd..eaee1a7ed0b50 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -2077,19 +2077,13 @@ int kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address, .pgd = pgd, .numpages = numpages, .mask_set = __pgprot(0), - .mask_clr = __pgprot(0), + .mask_clr = __pgprot(~page_flags & (_PAGE_NX|_PAGE_RW)), .flags = 0, }; if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)) goto out; - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_NX)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_NX); - - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW)) - cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW); - if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC)) cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr); -- 2.20.1