diff for duplicates of <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt index c8bacc8..0839fda 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N1/1.txt @@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:18:09AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote: > > so before > -> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauthõ72d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" +> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > directly supplied password: > -> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle000001" +> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Justify to the 80 character line length. > + */ > + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); -> + if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { +> + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + if (res < 0) @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ This starts to be unnecessarily complicated. This is what I would suggest: opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); -if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { +if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index 8c802df..b1b7ee6 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ "ref\020200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com\0" "From\0Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>\0" "Subject\0Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations\0" - "Date\0Tue, 25 Feb 2020 16:48:50 +0000\0" + "Date\0Tue, 25 Feb 2020 18:48:50 +0200\0" "To\0James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>\0" "Cc\0linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> @@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ "> \n" "> so before\n" "> \n" - "> keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth\303\26572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f\"\n" + "> keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f\"\n" "> \n" "> after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new\n" "> directly supplied password:\n" "> \n" - "> keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle\302\201000001\"\n" + "> keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001\"\n" "> \n" "> Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct\n" "> password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator\n" @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ "\n" "> +\t\t\t */\n" "> +\t\t\topt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);\n" - "> +\t\t\tif (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" + "> +\t\t\tif (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" "> +\t\t\t\tres = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,\n" "> +\t\t\t\t\t TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);\n" "> +\t\t\t\tif (res < 0)\n" @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ "This is what I would suggest:\n" "\n" "opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);\n" - "if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" + "if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" "\tres = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,\n" "\t\t TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);\n" "\tif (res < 0)\n" @@ -127,4 +127,4 @@ "\n" /Jarkko -9e1b809e955af99689b0033f2540b73665c97dc350063427b4110eb1fbfd5cde +2b826edb98d0d6fe7fe8e4aae55b6a7a14cd9870919be3ebae32eb3163631568
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