diff for duplicates of <20200226151512.GF3407@linux.intel.com> diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt index 1f8dc89..665f7a9 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N1/1.txt @@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 06:48:50PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > so before > > -> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauthõ72d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" +> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" > > > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > > directly supplied password: > > -> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle000001" +> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" > > > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 06:48:50PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > + */ > > + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); -> > + if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { +> > + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > > + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > + if (res < 0) @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 06:48:50PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > This is what I would suggest: > > opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); -> if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { +> if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index 9a6b2cc..dde559d 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ "ref\020200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com\0" "From\0Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>\0" "Subject\0Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations\0" - "Date\0Wed, 26 Feb 2020 15:15:12 +0000\0" + "Date\0Wed, 26 Feb 2020 17:15:12 +0200\0" "To\0James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>\0" "Cc\0linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> @@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ "> > \n" "> > so before\n" "> > \n" - "> > keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth\303\26572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f\"\n" + "> > keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f\"\n" "> > \n" "> > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new\n" "> > directly supplied password:\n" "> > \n" - "> > keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle\302\201000001\"\n" + "> > keyctl add trusted kmk \"new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001\"\n" "> > \n" "> > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct\n" "> > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator\n" @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ "> \n" "> > +\t\t\t */\n" "> > +\t\t\topt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);\n" - "> > +\t\t\tif (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" + "> > +\t\t\tif (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" "> > +\t\t\t\tres = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,\n" "> > +\t\t\t\t\t TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);\n" "> > +\t\t\t\tif (res < 0)\n" @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ "> This is what I would suggest:\n" "> \n" "> opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);\n" - "> if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" + "> if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {\n" "> \tres = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,\n" "> \t\t TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);\n" "> \tif (res < 0)\n" @@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ "\n" /Jarkko -b7b71071f865e9c9ebbebba66fb08281b9e52e06147d258011581b72257ed109 +44902853b9ca16af79ac087dc580d4f9e068f545278fb92995b04b66136c1447
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