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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>,
	Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
	Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/split_lock: Disable SLD if an unaware (out-of-tree) module enables VMX
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 18:42:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200403164244.GZ20730@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200403163007.6463-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 09:30:07AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Hook into native CR4 writes to disable split-lock detection if CR4.VMXE
> is toggled on by an SDL-unaware entity, e.g. an out-of-tree hypervisor
> module.  Most/all VMX-based hypervisors blindly reflect #AC exceptions
> into the guest, or don't intercept #AC in the first place.  With SLD
> enabled, this results in unexpected #AC faults in the guest, leading to
> crashes in the guest and other undesirable behavior.
> 
> Reported-by: "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
> Cc: Kenneth R. Crudup <kenny@panix.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
> Cc: Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> ---
> 
> A bit ugly, but on the plus side the code is largely contained to intel.c.
> I think forgoing the on_all_cpus() remote kill is safe? 

How would it be safe? You can't control where the module text will be
ran, or how quickly.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-03 16:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-03 16:30 [RFC PATCH] x86/split_lock: Disable SLD if an unaware (out-of-tree) module enables VMX Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:42 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2020-04-03 17:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-06 12:50 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 14:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 14:34     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 15:24     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 15:39       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 16:01         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 17:10           ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 18:39             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 22:54             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-08  9:12             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 11:02               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 21:37   ` Thomas Gleixner

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