From: Lev Olshvang <levonshe@gmail.com>
To: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Lev Olshvang <levonshe@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 5/5] UM:Prevent write to read-only pages :text, PLT/GOT tables from another process
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2020 17:20:45 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200406142045.32522-6-levonshe@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200406142045.32522-1-levonshe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lev Olshvang <levonshe@gmail.com>
---
arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index b4deb1bfbb68..2de21d52bd60 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
+/*
* Copyright (C) 2002 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com)
*/
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ static inline void arch_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
{
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROTECT_READONLY_USER_MEMORY
+ /* Forbid write to PROT_READ pages of foreign process */
+ if (write && foreign && (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
+ return false;
+ #endif
/* by default, allow everything */
return true;
}
@@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ static inline void activate_mm(struct mm_struct *old, struct mm_struct *new)
up_write(&new->mmap_sem);
}
-static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
+static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -65,7 +70,7 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
}
}
-static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm,
+static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
}
--
2.17.1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-06 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-06 14:20 [RFC PATCH 0/5] Prevent write to read-only pages (text, PLT/GOT Lev Olshvang
2020-04-06 14:20 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] security : hardening : prevent write to proces's read-only pages from another process Lev Olshvang
2020-04-06 19:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 10:16 ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-04-07 16:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-06 14:20 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] Prevent write to " Lev Olshvang
2020-04-06 14:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] Prevent write to read-only pages text, PLT/GOT tables " Lev Olshvang
2020-04-06 14:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] X86:Prevent write to read-only pages :text, " Lev Olshvang
2020-04-06 14:20 ` Lev Olshvang [this message]
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